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Foreword 
This is the final report of the findings from the field mission carried out during the week of 5-12 
September 2007 in the areas affected by the 15 August 2007 Magnitude 7.9 Earthquake near the Coast 
of Central Peru. 
The mission was carried out by a team of three engineers: Fabio Taucer (Team Leader – Joint Research 
Centre, European Commission, Ispra - Italy), John Alarcón (Arup, UK) and Emily So (University of 
Cambridge, UK), all members of the Earthquake Engineering Field Investigation Team (EEFIT – The 
Institution of Structural Engineers, London). 
The main objectives of the mission were to collect data and make observations leading to 
improvements in assessment and design methods and techniques for strengthening and retrofit, to 
gather data on socio-economic aspects and management of the disaster, as well as to assist the phase of 
reconstruction. The mission focused on the behaviour of non-engineered structures, in particular those 
of adobe construction, which caused 519 deaths and 1,366 injuries following the collapse of more than 
58,000 houses. 
The mission was carried out in close collaboration with the Delegation of the European Commission in 
Peru, with assistance from the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú and PREDECAM (Apoyo a la 
Prevención de Desasters de la Comunidad Andina); contacts were made with representatives of the 
Peruvian Civil Protection (Instituto Nacional de Defensa Civil -INDECI), as well as with NGO’s 
present and active in Peru. 
The field mission consisted in surveying the damaged areas of the Province of Ica, in particular the 
cities of Pisco, Ica and Chincha Alta, as well as the smaller city centres of Tambo de Mora, Paracas, 
Guadalupe and El Carmen, and the Port of San Martín. Special attention was given to surveying the 
rural mountain areas up the valley of the Cañete river: Lunahuaná, Zúñiga, San Jerónimo and 
Huangáscar. The survey focused in documenting the damage and interviewing the affected population, 
with the purpose of gathering not only technical information, but also to understand the socio-economic 
aspects of the disaster in order to draw recommendations concerning the management of the disaster 
and the reconstruction phase. 
 
 
EEFIT Team: Fabio Taucer, Emily So, John Alarcón 
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1 Description of the Earthquake Event 
Written by Dr John Alarcon, Arup 
Reviewed by Zygmunt Lubkowski, Arup 
On 15 August 2007, at 23h 40min 59sec (UMT) – 18h 40min 59sec (local time), a 7.9 Mw magnitude 
earthquake occurred off the coast of Central Peru. A summary of the location and magnitudes assigned 
to this earthquake by the local and by three international agencies is shown in Table 1.1. A point to 
highlight is that the epicentre given by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) is located 
approximately 45 km northeast of the epicentre given by the Geophysical Institute of Peru (IGP). The 
difference in the reported moment Mw and local ML magnitudes estimates of IGP may be due to 
saturation of the local scale. Figure 1.1 presents the IGP epicentral location of the earthquake (red star) 
and the epicentral distribution of events recorded from 1996 to 2006, discriminated according to focal 
depth.  
Table 1.1 Earthquake parameters 
Epicentre location Magnitude 
Agency 
Latitude S° Longitude W° 
Focal 
Depth (km) 
Mw Ms ML
IGP (Peru) -13.670 -76.760 40 7.9  7.0 
USGS (USA) -13.354 -76.509 39 8.0   
HU-CMT (USA) -13.73 -77.04 34 8.0 8.0  
ISC (Internet) -13.358 -76.522 30  7.8  
IGP: Instituto Geofísico del Perú (Geophysical Institute of Peru)  HU-CMT: Harvard University CMT catalogue 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Earthquake epicentral location (red star) and seismic activity in the region from 1996 to 
2006. Black star shows the location of a 4.1ML foreshock. Circles represent events with focal depths of 
less than 60 km while squares show earthquakes with deeper focal depths (Source: www.igp.gob.pe) 
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The 15 August 2007 event occurred in the subduction boundary between the Nazca and South 
American plates, in which the Nazca plate slides underneath the American plate. The velocity of 
relative displacements between these plates has been estimated as 70-80 mm/yr (e.g., Norabuena et al., 
1999). The tensor solution assigned to this event corresponds to a reverse fault with strike 324°, dip 27° 
and slip 64° (USGS). This focal solution is preferred over the alternative one based on regional 
tectonics, which generally dips towards the NE. The earthquake occurred in an identified seismic gap 
along the coast of central Peru, as presented in Figure 1.2. The gap was identified based on recorded 
earthquakes from 1940 to 1996. 
 
Figure 1.2 Location of large subduction earthquakes along the central coast of Peru from 1940 to 2007 
(after Tavera et al., 2008) 
The areas mostly affected by the earthquake are within the Ica, Huancavelica and Lima regions (see 
Figure 1.1), with an official death toll of 519 people and 1,366 injured, a total of 58,581 houses 
destroyed or demolished as a result of the severe damage induced, and 13,585 houses affected to some 
degree (OCHA SR21, 2007; www.onu.org.pe). The Peruvian Government estimated losses from the 
earthquake in US$450 millions, and expected a reduction in the economic growth of 0.3% for 2007 as a 
direct cause of the event1; detailed information concerning damage distribution and people affected is 
discussed in the following chapters of this report. Figure 1.3 presents the intensity map generated by 
the USGS after the earthquake, using ShakeMap (Wald et al., 1999); the maximum intensities (MMI 
VII) were reported to have occurred between the cities of Imperial in the North and Ica city in the 
South. Even though Lima city is classified with intensity VI, little damage was reported there. Figure 
1.4 presents the intensity map prepared by IGP, whose maximum intensity (VII) distribution is similar 
to that from the USGS, but whose areas of intensity VI and V occur closer to the epicentre than in the 
USGS map (i.e., the area of intensity VII is smaller than that calculated by the USGS). 
IGP published the distribution of 355 aftershocks with local magnitudes ML equal to or larger than 3.0, 
which occurred between the 15th and the 20th of August 2007 (see Figure 1.5). These aftershocks have 
focal depths of less than 50 km, and are grouped into three clusters (G1, G2 and G3). According to the 
location and distribution of aftershocks, IGP suggests a rupture process occurring south-eastward in an 
area of approximately 150x100 km. 
                                                          
1 The information was retrieved from the Peruvian press during the first weeks following the disaster 
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On the other hand, Ji & Cheng (2007) estimated the source process of the 15 August 2007 mainshock 
from teleseismic inversion (see Figure 1.6). From these results, two predominant slip areas are 
observed at the epicentre and at a region southeast of it. Tavera et al. (2008) show that these two areas 
coincide with the larger aftershocks recorded by IGP (Figure 1.5), constituting the basis to explain the 
special characteristics of the recorded strong ground motions, as described below.  
A total of 18 accelerometer stations recorded the 15 August 2007 mainshock, with most of the 
instruments being located in the city of Lima and two of them installed in the city of Ica. Since a 
thorough examination of these ground motions is presented in Tavera et al. (2008), in the following a 
more general study of some of the recordings is presented.  
From the 18 accelerometer stations mentioned above, only four recordings from the city of Lima and 
one from the city of Ica (located at approximately 150 km and 110 km from the epicentre, respectively) 
were available to the public by mid November 2007 at the website of the Peruvian-Japanese Centre of 
Seismic Investigation and Hazard Reduction (CISMID). These time histories were filtered and 
processed at Imperial College London as described in Tavera et al. (2008). Table 1.2 presents a 
summary of the maximum recorded accelerations for each orthogonal component at these stations, 
including some relevant characteristics as site conditions and the source-to-site distance computed 
adopting three different methods. Complementary, Figure 1.7 presents the E-W components of the five 
time histories presented in Table 1.2.  
 
Figure 1.3 Intensity map generated using ShakeMap (Source: www.usgs.gov). The plot includes the 
fault rupture area (rectangle) and the epicentral location (star) estimated by the USGS 
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 Figure 1.4 MMI intensity map generated by IGP (Source: www.igp.gob.pe) 
 
 
Figure 1.5 Aftershock distribution of events with local magnitude ML equal to or larger than 3.0, 
recorded between the 15th and the 20th of August 2007. (Source: www.igp.gob.pe) 
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 Figure 1.6 Earthquake slip distribution (Source: www.usgs.gov) 
 
Table 1.2  Horizontal and vertical peak ground accelerations (PGA) values for the East-West, North-
South and vertical recorded ground motions 
Station CISMID (Lima) 
San Isidro 
(Lima) 
Callao 
(Lima) 
La Molina 
(Lima) 
Ica Univer. 
(Ica) 
E-W PGA (cm/s2) 73.7 54.49 100.9 78.1 272.2 
N-S PGA (cm/s2) 59.98 57.88 58.41 18.46 334.1 
Vertical PGA (cm/s2) 32.58 32.21 31.7 56.21 192.2 
Site conditions (NEHRP) C C D C D 
Site conditions Vs-30  (m/s) 250 - 350 470 250 
Repi distance (km) 159 152 159 145 117 
Rjb distance (km) 103 96 105 86 0.0 
Rrup distance (km) 112.6 105 112 98 36.9 
Notes: Vs-30 values from Tavera et al. (2008). Repi is the epicentral distance; Rjb is the Joyner-Boore distance 
definition; Rrup is the closest distance to the fault rupture (see Abrahamson & Shedlock, 1997). 
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Figure 1.7 Strong ground motion recordings at CISMID, San Isidro, Callao, La Molina and ICA2 
stations. 
Two relevant features of the recorded time-histories are the length and the amplitude distribution in 
time of the ground motions. All recordings show total durations of approximately 160 seconds (about 
2.6 minutes) with three sequences of motions: the first one lasting around 30-50 seconds (this duration 
varies from Lima to Ica recordings, with the latter ground motion having shorter duration), followed by 
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relative uniform and smaller amplitudes that last 20 to 30 seconds, and a final sequence of larger 
motions. This particularity of the ground motions being distributed in two strong packs helped most of 
the population to evacuate their houses during the intermediate part of the shaking (see Section 12.1). 
The principal explanations for the duration and distribution of these ground motions are the rupture 
model having two zones of large displacements (which generated the two packs of motions) and the 
low fault rupture velocity, calculated at about 1.4  km/s, which is almost one third of the mean expected 
velocity in similar earthquakes (Tavera et al., 2008). 
Figure 1.8 presents the peak ground acceleration (PGA) values according to a seismic zonation study 
published by the Geophysical Institute of Peru, for horizontal accelerations with 10% probability of 
exceedance in 50 years. From this map, the zonified PGA at Ica city is between 550 to 600 cm/s2; the 
maximum recorded PGA at Ica during the 15 August 2007 event, equal to 334 cm/s2, is slightly larger 
than half of the zonation value.  
 
Figure 1.8 Peak ground acceleration (cm/s2) zonation map (Source: www.indeci.gob.pe); no 
information was found about soil conditions for this map, but it is thought to be for rock sites 
Figure 1.9 shows the response spectra of three of the ground motions recorded (two at Lima and one at 
Ica); the spectra for the N-S and E-W components are plotted for each station. These spectra are 
compared to those calculated using the Atkinson & Boore (2003) and the Kano et al. (2006) predictive 
equations, derived from databases for subduction events. Source-to-site distances and specific site 
conditions for prediction at each station were selected accordingly with the data consigned in Table 1.2 
(e.g., following Vs-30 values for application into Kano et al. (2006); NEHRP site class for application 
into Atkinson & Boore (2003)). The comparison shows that independent of site conditions, the 
predictions at Lima tend to overestimate the results from the actual recordings, with the exception of 
the Atkinson & Boore (2003) predictions at large periods. With respect to the recording at Ica, Kano et 
al. (2006) predictions are larger by factors of 2 to 3, while the predictions using Atkinson & Boore 
(2003) equations are closer to the recorded motions at short periods, but are smaller at periods greater 
than 1 second. In view of the good prediction obtained at the ICA2 station, the Atkison & Boore (2003) 
response spectrum is employed in a structural back analysis presented in Section 5.2.3 for the collapse 
of a reinforced concrete board in the town of Pozo Santo, where short period responses are expected to 
be of relevance in the analysis. 
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Figure 1.9 Comparison of recorded spectra at three stations with predicted spectra using the Atkinson 
& Boore (2003) and Kano et al. (2006) predictive equations. Note that scales are different in each plot 
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2 Earthquake Affected Region 
Written by Dr John Alarcon, Arup 
Reviewed by Zygmunt Lubkowski, Arup 
The most severely affected area, which spreads between the Pacific Coast and the Andes, corresponds 
to a desert region with few small settlements located between larger agglomerations and cities. The 
areas visited during this EEFIT mission are shown in Figure 2.1 and listed in detail below (the number 
assigned to these areas does not correspond to the chronological order of the visit): 
1. San Vicente de Cañete / Imperial 
2. Chincha Alta / Chincha Baja / Tambo de Mora 
3. Pisco / San Andrés 
4. Paracas 
5. San Martín (Puerto) 
6. Pozo Santo 
7. Ica / Guadalupe / El Carmen / San Juan Bautista 
8. Lunahuaná 
9. Zúñiga 
10. Huangáscar 
A summary of the number of inhabitants in some of the visited districts/cities is presented in Table 2.1. 
The information presented in this table is based on the national census carried out in 2005 (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística e Informática, INEI), and the population shown corresponds to the number of 
inhabitants in the city/village and its suburban/rural areas. The districts that concentrate most of the 
population in the earthquake affected zone are, in decreasing order, Ica, Chincha Alta and Pisco. 
The economy of the area visited is based on agriculture (mainly grapes and asparagus), wine 
production, fishing and its derived industry producing fish-flour for exportation, and tourism around 
the Nazca lines and the Paracas National Reserve (see Section 12.3). 
Table 2.1 Population of some of the areas visited. Number of people includes city/village and 
suburban/rural areas belonging to the district (INEI, www.inei.gob.pe) 
City/Village Population City/Village Population 
Chincha Alta 56,085 Pisco 54,193 
Chincha Baja 12,052 San Andrés 14,134 
Huangascar 724 San Vic. Cañete 43,943 
Ica 117,939 Tambo de Mora 4,682 
Lunahuaná 4,383 Zúñiga 1,194 
Paracas 1,252   
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Figure 2.1 Areas visited during the Earthquake Engineering Field Investigation Team (EEFIT) mission 
to Peru (base map from ITMB Publishing Ltd). The entire area visited is within seismic zone 3 as 
prescribed in the Peruvian design code (see Figure 2.2) 
The seismic resistant design code of Peru (Norma Técnica de Edificaciones E.030, 1997), divides the 
entire country into three regions, assigning peak ground accelerations of 0.15g, 0.30g and 0.40g for 
regions 1, 2 and 3 respectively (see Figure 2.2). These acceleration values correspond to ground 
motions with a probability of exceedance of 10% in 50 years (i.e., ground motions with a return period 
of 475 years). The area severely affected by the 15 August 2007 earthquake is classified as Zone 3 (see 
red strip in Figure 2.2); the maximum acceleration recorded at Ica (0.30g) corresponds to 75% of the 
design acceleration given by the Norma Técnica de Edificaciones E.030, 1997. 
Figure 2.3 presents the geological map of the Ica region, on the top of which is marked the area visited 
during the EEFIT mission (bounded with a blue line). The figure shows that most of the area visited 
corresponds to Quaternary deposits (Qh-c). 
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 Figure 2.2 Peruvian seismic zoning map for design (Norma Técnica de Edificaciones E.030, 1997) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Geological map of Ica Department. A large portion of the visited area in this department 
(shaped in blue) corresponds to Quaternary deposits. (www.ingemmet.gob.pe) 
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3 Geotechnical Features 
Written by Dr John Alarcon, Arup 
Reviewed by Zygmunt Lubkowski , Arup 
This section presents relevant geotechnical features observed during the EEFIT mission. These features 
include liquefaction, landslides and site responses. 
3.1 Liquefaction  
The western area of the town of Tambo de Mora (site number 2 in Figure 2.1) was severely affected by 
liquefaction. Even though the total area in which liquefaction occurred covers an area of approximately 
2 km2, the zone of housing affected covered an area of only 200x350 m, where the liquefied sand was 
observed inside houses and on the sides of the streets (Figure 3.1). Most of the structures affected 
correspond to 1 to 2 storeys high reinforced concrete (RC) confined masonry (Figure 3.2), which 
suffered settlements from 0.2 to 1.0 m relative to street level (Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.5). The paved 
road serving these houses was in good condition, with no evidence of severe damage (Figure 3.1), 
which lead to the conclusion that the liquefied stratum corresponds to a shallow layer removed/replaced 
during the construction of the streets, but left for the foundation of the houses. The street lamps toppled 
at the base to angles of up to 50° with respect to the horizontal plane (Figure 3.4). There were 5 deaths 
in the area and many people were able to escape from their homes as they exited after the first half of 
the ground motion (see Section 12.1). People commented that if they had not done so, they would have 
been trapped, since the second part of the ground motion was stronger, making the houses to settle 
dramatically. Liquefaction was also observed at the town jail, 2 km north of the housing zone severely 
affected (photos were not allowed to be taken for security reasons). 
According to the inhabitants of the neighbourhood affected in Tambo de Mora, the area had 
experienced liquefaction in the past, in 1970 and 1974, with “water and sand coming from the earth”. 
Damage during those past events was light though, and no family was relocated as a measure of 
prevention. 
The foundation details of these houses could not be inspected during the visit, but are expected to be 
similar to those observed in the neighbouring town of Chincha Alta (see Section 3.3). Since each house 
affected by liquefaction settled relatively uniformly, it may be concluded that these foundations 
correspond to shallow continuous footings. The large settlements observed suggest the occurrence of 
large cyclic stress ratios in the sand layer. 
Figure 3.1 Liquefied uniform medium/fine size 
sand (note undamaged street to the left of the boat) 
Figure 3.2 Houses in the area affected by 
liquefaction were mostly confined masonry 
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Figure 3.3 Large settlements reached values of 
approximately 1.0 metre 
Figure 3.4 Street lamps toppled at the base up to 
approximately 50° with the horizontal plan 
Figure 3.5 Large settlements reached values of 
approximately 1.0 metre 
Figure 3.6 Liquefaction affected houses being 
demolished by the government 
 
3.2 Landslides 
Landslides were reported to occur along the Pan-American Highway, which extends from Alaska to 
Chile crossing Peru along its coast from North to South; this is the main highway of Peru. At the time 
of the EEFIT team visit, 22 days after the main event, the Pan-American Highway had been cleared 
from debris and entirely repaired. According to information received at the Pontificia Universidad 
Católica del Perú (PUCP), the area mostly affected was the stretch between Chincha Alta and San 
Clemente (see area limited in blue colour in Figure 3.7).  
A section with slope instability was observed along the Pan-American Highway at approximately 10 
km north of Cincha Alta (see point No.1 in Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8). The landslide covered an area of 
approximately 50 x 10 m, affecting a soil mass (quaternary deposits of predominantly granular 
material) of up to 10,000 m3. The largest vertical displacement of the scarp was measured at 0.4 m 
(Figure 3.9). Evidence of few shallow landslides was observed in the stretch between Chincha Alta and 
Pisco, but the material had been removed at the time of the visit. 
A 4 metre high stone retaining wall that supported a 20 m stretch of the road between Lunahuaná and 
Imperial failed at approximately 2 km from Lunahuaná (Figure 3.7); tension cracks were evident on the 
road, which led to closure of one traffic lane. 
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On the last day of the mission, the EEFIT team travelled eastwards to the mountains in order to identify 
the boundary between areas of significant and minor damage. During this journey into the mountains 
the most common process of instability observed were debris flows and rock falls, such at those shown 
in Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.12. The rock fall given in Figure 3.11 hit the abutment of a pedestrian 
bridge, leading to the collapse of the structure (see Section 6.2). No evidence of deep landslides was 
observed during the field visit. 
2 
1
 
Figure 3.7 Stretch of the Pan-American Highway affected by landslides and soil failure of road 
structure (delimitated in dark blue colour). Points 1 and 2 (violet circles) show the location of 
landslides observed during the visit. 
 
Figure 3.8 Scarp of landslide on the Pan-American 
Highway; two tension cracks are observed at the 
bottom of the picture 
Figure 3.9 Detail of landslide scarp; the largest 
vertical displacement was measured at 0.4 m 
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 Figure 3.10 Stone retaining wall failure close to 
Lunahuaná 
Figure 3.11 Rock fall that hit the abutment of a 
pedestrian bridge crossing the Cañete river (see 
point No.2 in Figure 3.8 for location) 
 
Figure 3.12 Debris and rock flow on the slope of 
mountains; most of the landslides shown in the 
photo were already there before the earthquake 
 
Figure 3.13 Debris fall in the mountain area along 
the Cañete river valley 
 
3.3 Foundation behaviour 
Evaluation of foundations is rather complex since access to them is rarely possible; foundation failure 
is only observable in extreme cases when its failure is evident, which was not the case in any of the 
areas visited in Peru. Considering the structural typology of most of the structures observed during the 
visit, foundations can be assumed to be shallow with isolated poorly connected footings. Exceptions 
may be schools, hospitals and in general engineered structures. In the city of Chincha Alta (site No.2 in 
Figure 2.1) a foundation reconstruction process was observed in which the footings were joined with 
poorly detailed reinforced concrete (Figure 3.14). In general terms, such foundations did not suffer 
serious problems during the earthquake, with the exception of the liquefaction induced failures reported 
in Section 3.1. 
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 Figure 3.14 Reconstruction of a house in Chincha Alta; individual footings are joined using poorly 
detailed reinforced concrete 
3.4 Site effects 
Site effects may be evident in the level of damage observed in the city of Pisco and the town of San 
Andrés. Besides political limits, the boundaries between these two agglomerations are indistinguishable 
and thus, from the spatial point of view, can be considered as one city. Damage in Pisco, especially in 
the central part of the city, showed a greater degree of damage than in San Andrés. This may be due to 
various reasons, such as age of constructions (being older in central Pisco), structural typology and 
quality of construction (being better in San Andrés), and more unfavourable site conditions in central 
Pisco, as shown by the hazard zonation map elaborated by the Peruvian National Civil Defence 
(INDECI) (Figure 3.15). Characteristics of the delimited zones are: 
o Very high hazard (Zone a – red colour): soils with undrained strength capacities between 0.5 
to 0.75 kg/cm2 (about 50-75 kPa) 
o High hazard (Zone b – orange colour): soils with undrained strength capacities between 0.5 
and 1.5 kg/cm2 (about 50-150 kPa) 
o Intermediate hazard (Zone c – yellow colour): soils with undrained strength capacities 
between 1.5 and 2.0 kg/cm2 (about 150-200 kPa). 
The thickness of the soil deposits is not given in the information available at INDECI website, 
however, during a meeting with INDECI personnel it was mentioned that the deposits at the centre of 
Pisco were deeper than in the rest of the affected area. 
It is important to note that the INDECI zonation map of Pisco summarises a broad group of hazards, 
including seismic hazard, tsunamis and floods caused by both heavy rains and river overflow. A more 
helpful way to identify and address each problem appropriately would be to plot and make available to 
the community and governmental institutions maps for each one of these natural events. Similar maps 
exist for Chincha (Figure 3.16) and Cañetes (not included in this report).  
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 Figure 3.15 Hazard zoning map of the city of Pisco (source: INDECI); the map summarises hazard 
evaluation from earthquakes, tsunami and floods 
 
Figure 3.16 Hazard zoning map of the city of Chincha (source: INDECI) 
3.5 References 
INDECI, Instituto Nacional de Defensa Civil, www.indeci.gob.pe  
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4 Tsunami 
Written by Fabio Taucer, Joint Research Centre / Dr John Alarcon, Arup 
Reviewed by Zygmunt Lubkowski, Arup 
Following the main event, a tsunami warning was issued for Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru by the 
Hawaii Institute of Geophysics. The tsunami waves travelled as far as Japan, where heights of 0.5 m 
were recorded. Leaders of traditional fishermen unions from San Andrés creek in Pisco estimated that 
about 107 boats were damaged, 50 destroyed and 2,000 fishermen (about 17,000 families) affected as a 
consequence of the tsunami triggered by the earthquake (OCHA SR10, 2007). 
Along the Peruvian Coast, the EEFIT team evidenced tsunami damage in Paracas (see point No. 4 in 
Figure 2.1), 20 km south of the city of Pisco, and at Tambo de Mora, where widespread liquefaction 
was observed as discussed in the preceding section. 
Paracas is a tourist town with beach front restaurants and well constructed hotels and restaurants, 
mainly constructed if reinforced concrete confined masonry. Further south are holiday villas and a 
yacht club, where damage to a private jetty was observed, which shifted in the longitudinal direction 
and failed after developing hinges at the connections with the underlying piles (Figure 7.12); it was not 
clear whether damage to the jetty was due to the tsunami, the induced ground motions or both. 
 
Figure 4.1 Tsunami water height in holiday villas 
at Paracas 
 
Figure 4.2 Tsunami water height in holiday villas 
at Paracas 
 
Figure 4.3 Tsunami damage at shore in front of 
holiday villas in Paracas 
 
Figure 4.4 Tsunami damage at Paracas waterfront 
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Along the road next to the holiday villas of Paracas, there was very little visible structural damage, with 
only one wooden access-gate smashed due to water ingress and some damaged light structures for 
keeping boats; water marks were measured at 1.4 m with respect to the ground (approximately 2.5 m 
with respect to sea level), as shown in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2. 
Locals in the town of Paracas recall a wave height reaching up to 1.6 m at the coast, which damaged a 
row of lightweight vendor stalls along the beach (the wave height was measured with respect to ground 
level at the vendor stalls). When the team visited the area, these stalls had already been reconstructed, 
as shown in Figure 4.6. Along the water front promenade of Paracas, opposite to where the vendors 
were located, water marks of up to 1 m were observed (with respect to the RC pavement of the 
waterfront); an underground fresh water cistern of a restaurant in front of the promenade was flooded 
with sea water. The local population informed the EEFIT team that the runup of the tsunami went as far 
as 200 m inland, though no clear evidence was observed. 
Structural damage in Paracas included a jetty (larger than the one found at the yacht club) and cracking 
of the concrete pavement of the waterfront promenade (Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5), including localised 
cracks in adjacent columns, while the building stock, composed mainly of 1-2 storey RC confined brick 
masonry houses showed only minor damage, with a few adobe houses suffering moderate damage. No 
deaths, collapses or heavy damage was reported to have occurred as a consequence of the tsunami.  
 
Figure 4.5 Cracking of RC pavement/slab at 
Paracas waterfront 
 
Figure 4.6 Reconstructed vendor stalls along the 
Paracas beach front 
In Tambo de Mora, locals mentioned observing a tsunami wave height of approximately 2.5 m. The 
EERI tsunami reconnaissance team determined a maximum run-up of 10 m south of the Paracas 
peninsula occurring along unhabited areas (EERI, 2007). 
4.1 References 
EERI (2007) “Learning from Earthquakes – The Pisco, Peru, earthquake of August 15, 2007”, 
Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Special Earthquake Report, www.eeri.org. 
Hawaii Institute of Geophysics and Planetology, http://www.higp.hawaii.edu  
OCHA Situation Report 10 (2007) “Peru Earthquake Report No. 10”, United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 24 August. 
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5 Performance of Structures 
Written by Fabio Taucer, Joint Research Centre 
Reviewed by Paolo Negro, Joint Research Centre 
The damage sustained by building structures, especially residential, was the main cause of economic 
losses in the area affected by the earthquake. The description of the performance of building structures 
is introduced in this chapter by distinguishing two types of design situations: non-engineered and 
engineered structures. Whereas non-engineered structures were responsible for most of the damage 
observed, engineered structures performed satisfactorily, with the exception of buildings of low 
construction quality and non-conforming earthquake designs. 
5.1 Non-Engineered 
According to Arya (1994), “non-engineered buildings” are defined as those that are spontaneously and 
informally constructed in a traditional manner without any or little intervention by qualified architects 
and engineers in their design. These vernacular dwellings are proportioned based on experience and are 
mostly made out of wood, clay, concrete blocks, sun-dried clay bricks (adobe), field (or rubble) stone 
and brick, as well as combinations of locally available materials; cement, lime, or clay-mud are 
generally used for mortar compositions. A thorough description of this type of structures and their 
distribution in Latin America is given in Papanikolaou and Taucer (2004). 
Most of the non-engineered houses in the area affected by the earthquake are made of adobe 
construction, usually located in rural areas outside large urban centres with characteristics that further 
contribute to their vulnerability (Lizarralde, 2000), namely: 
o Lack of proper access roads to the rural areas; 
o Lack of a wide coverage of public services; 
o Lack of education of the residents (including high levels of illiteracy); 
o Poverty of most of the population; 
o Lack of political influence and social isolation in some cases; 
o Difficulties in receiving information, and little access to knowledge; 
o High risk locations, usually on slopes and in proximity to water resources (therefore prone to 
floods); 
o Lack of building codes and construction supervision. 
These issues are further discussed in Section 12. 
For the purposes of the present report, non-engineered structures are classified as: traditional earth 
structures, masonry structures and infilled RC frames. 
5.1.1 Traditional earth structures 
There are three main types of traditional earth structures in the affected area: 
o adobe, usually one storey high along the coast, and up to two stories in the mountain areas 
(Figure 5.9); 
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o a combination of adobe and quincha1  at the second storey; 
o tapial or tierra pisada2 
Figure 5.1 Pisco historic waterfront: damaged 
adobe building with quincha at second storey 
 
Figure 5.2 Pisco historic waterfront: adobe 
building with quincha exposed at second storey 
Adobe structures are the most common type of earth construction in Peru; structures using quincha at 
the second storey are less frequent, being usually present in cultural heritage areas (Figure 5.1 and 
Figure 5.2) along the coast. Tapia structures, which are mostly used for the construction of boundary 
walls in rural areas, suffered damage from overturning, without causing injuries or substantial 
economic losses. 
 
Figure 5.3 Collapsed adobe house in Ica 
 
Figure 5.4 Debris of collapsed adobe houses in Ica 
According to information received from INDECI, in the most affected areas (Pisco, Chincha Alta and 
Ica) approximately 80% of adobe houses collapsed (Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4)3, an outcome that was 
more than predictable in view of the lessons learned from previous disasters in Peru and worldwide 
(Eje Cafetero, Colombia, 1999; Bam, Iran, 2003; El Salvador, 2001), as well as from the research 
                                                          
1 In Peru, quincha consists of wooden frames in-filled with interwoven cane and coated with a mixture of mud (barro) 
and plaster, gypsum or sand combined with concrete on both sides. 
2 Tapial is constructed by erecting wooden or metal forms for the walls and filling them with a moist cement stabilized 
earth mix which is compacted by pounding with hand tools or with a mechanical compactor. 
3 INDECI informed that 85% of housing was damaged, while in the province of Ica, 60% of houses in poor areas had 
been destroyed (OCHA SR3, 2007). 
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carried out on the earthquake performance of adobe houses in universities across Latin America, 
especially in Peru, Colombia and Mexico 
Adobe structures are constructed following traditional techniques using material and labour locally 
available, based on experience and in general without accounting for earthquake resistant design 
principles. The collapse of adobe structures is due mainly to the following factors: 
o Heavy mass, thus inducing large inertial forces from the earthquake. 
o Very low strength with respect to the density of the material (among the lowest of all 
construction materials). 
o Failure of the material in a brittle manner, thus not allowing for energy dissipation and giving 
no warning to occupants before collapse. 
Other factors or a combination of them, that contribute to the collapse of an adobe structure are: 
o Low quality of construction, especially of mortar. 
o Slender walls and long unsupported lengths. 
o Large percentage of openings (windows and doors). 
o Unstaggered brick arrangement at corners, thus leaving a clean joint between perpendicular 
walls. 
o Flexible roofs and/or floors that offer no restraint to out-of-plane bending of walls, and 
absence of a ring-beam (Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7) 
o Heavy roofs (only in mountain areas; along the coast, due to the absence of rain, roofs are 
flexible and light) that increase inertial mass, thus leading to a higher the base shear. 
A sketch summarizing the typical construction mistakes, which are held responsible for the partial or 
total collapse of earthen structures, as observed in the areas affected by the earthquake, is provided by 
Minke (2001) in Figure 5.5. 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Graphical indication of the most common deficiencies found in self-built adobe houses 
(Minke, 2001) 
Adobe houses typically fail by out-of-plane bending and overturning of walls, further accelerated by 
the demands imposed in the in-plane direction. No matter how well an adobe house is constructed 
(avoid the problems given in the second list of factors contributing to failure), an adobe house is bound 
to collapse in a sudden, brittle manner. Improving construction techniques, geometry, detailing and 
arrangement of walls (Figure 5.8, Figure 5.10 and Figure 5.11) only retards their collapse, as shown by 
some adobe houses, especially farther away form the epicentre, with lower storey heights (up in the 
mountains due to the cold weather) (Figure 5.12) and/or better quality construction (cultural heritage or 
haciendas, Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.13), that did not collapse or sustained only limited damage. 
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Figure 5.6 Flexible roof offers restrain in only one 
direction 
 
Figure 5.7 Walls not restrained by the roof 
collapsed out-of-plane 
 
Figure 5.8 Sturdier walls up the Cañete river 
valley in Zúñiga close to collapse 
 
Figure 5.9 Two storey adobe house damaged in 
Huangáscar 
 
Figure 5.10 Freestanding adobe wall near 
Guadalupe with lateral supports (or machones) 
 
Figure 5.11 Manor in Lunahuaná showing walls 
laterally supported by machones 
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 Figure 5.12 Low height adobe houses up the valley 
of river Cañete showing no damage 
 
Figure 5.13 Historic hacienda in El Carmen 
showing limited damage 
The only factor that prevents the collapse in a brittle manner of an adobe house is the inclusion of 
reinforcement, either in the form of bamboo rods inserted inside of walls or as steel or polyester nets 
tied and plastered onto the surface of walls, as described in Section 5.2.1, that hold together the adobe 
bricks and provide for ductility and energy dissipation. 
5.1.2 Masonry structures 
Masonry structures have been included in the list of non-engineered structures as their large majority 
was built prior to the existence of modern construction codes. These structures correspond mainly to 
cultural heritage and official buildings, and are mostly found near the central squares of cities and 
towns. 
The masonry structures of the areas visited are built from clay bricks, usually with elaborate facades 
and arches at the front. Apart from a few collapses, such as the one described in the last paragraph of 
this section, these structures showed medium to light damage. 
The performance of masonry structures was somehow satisfactorily due to the following reasons: 
o The quality of construction of these structures, owing to their institutional or cultural 
importance, is in general higher than that of standard buildings. 
o The walls of these buildings have in general a large thickness and thus provide a larger out-of-
plane resistance. 
o These buildings have rigid roofs and/or slabs that act as a rigid diaphragm restraining the out-
of-plane displacements of walls.  
In spite of the good performance observed, it is possible to say that had the earthquake ground motion 
been higher at the visited locations, these structures would have inevitably collapsed in a brittle, sudden 
manner. 
At the Plaza Mayor in Ica, a large institutional building of masonry construction with a series of arches 
at the front was reported with no damage along one of the sides of the square (Figure 5.14), whereas at 
the opposite side of the square, the same type of building (probably of newer construction, as evidenced 
by the larger, square windows) had failed at the corner (Figure 5.15), probably due to pounding from an 
adjacent, taller RC building, confirming the brittle mode of failure of these structures. 
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 Figure 5.14 Masonry structure in Plaza de Armas, 
Ica, showing no damage 
 
Figure 5.15 Severely damaged masonry structure 
in Plaza de Armas, Ica, at corner next to a RC 
building (Photo: Dr. Ing. Jorge E. Alva Hurtado, 
Universidad Nacional de Ingeniería, Peru) 
5.1.3 Infilled reinforced concrete frames 
Infilled RC frames included in the category of non-engineered structures correspond to those buildings 
non-conforming to earthquake resistant design standards; this type of structure is common in Northern 
South American countries (e.g., Venezuela and Colombia), where adobe construction is no longer part 
of traditional construction practice and has been replaced by the local population for RC frames with 
hollow clay infill bricks used without qualified assistance. 
 
Figure 5.16 RC infilled confined brick masonry house in Guadalupe 
The factors that can make infilled non-engineered RC frames highly vulnerable to earthquakes are: 
o Irregular designs both in height and in plan, resulting from using the first storey as parking or 
commerce, or from the sequential addition in time of new portions of the house, with non-
coincident or discontinuous beams and columns, and abrupt changes in stiffness and mass. 
o Poor detailing, in particular insufficient stirrups and splicing lengths of reinforcement, 
resulting in inadequate shear and flexural capacity, as well as in limited confinement, thus 
rendering the structure brittle with low energy dissipation capacity. 
o In contrast to adobe houses that are in general one storey high, infilled RC structures easily 
reach two or three storeys and have heavy slabs, which induce large shear loads at the base, 
making this type of structures extremely vulnerable and leaving little time for occupants to 
escape in the event of an earthquake. 
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In the region visited, very few of this class of structures were found and no collapses were observed. 
The low number of RC infilled frames in the Peruvian building stock is due to the fact that building 
owners with limited economic means can only afford adobe construction, whereas families higher in 
the economic scale often choose to build with RC confined brick masonry with the assistance of 
qualified engineers, although the low quality of some constructions (Figure 5.16) may lead to conclude 
that in many cases no qualified assistance had been provided. However, since most of the RC confined 
masonry structures performed well, even those that may had not been designed by an engineer, they are 
included in Section 5.2 as engineered structures. 
5.2 Engineered 
Engineered constructions make up only a fraction of the total number of houses of the Ica region, and 
are concentrated in the major cities of Ica and Pisco. This type of structures performed in general 
satisfactorily, apart from a few cases described in Section 5.2.3.  
Earth structures constructed for earthquake resistance are included in this section, as they are designed 
by qualified engineers, even though in many cases some of the principles adopted may not be contained 
in the provisions of current construction standards in Peru. 
5.2.1 Earthquake resistant earth structures 
During the field reconnaissance, a few examples of adobe houses designed or upgraded for earthquake 
resistance prior to the disaster event were found in the towns of Guadalupe, Zúñiga and Huangáscar, all 
performing satisfactorily during the earthquake. 
 
Figure 5.17 Adobe house in Guadalupe upgraded 
with steel net reinforcement plastered to the 
exterior and interior surface and showing good 
performance 
 
Figure 5.18 Collapsed right corner of the adobe 
house shown in Figure 5.17 (not upgraded due to 
insufficient funds) 
Nearby Ica, in the town of Guadalupe, an adobe house was upgraded by the Universidad Pontificia 
Católica del Perú (PUCP) by means of strips of steel net tied and plastered to the exterior and interior 
surfaces of the adobe walls (Figure 5.17) (San Bartolome et. al, 2004); the house exhibited good 
performance after the earthquake, with the only portion of the wall not upgraded (due to insufficient 
funds) collapsing out-of-plane (Figure 5.18). The technique used in retrofitting this house was 
developed at PUCP; Figure 5.19 and Figure 5.20 show ongoing research where a polymer mesh 
(similar to the type used for stabilising soil) is used in place of a steel net, with the purpose of 
achieving a more ductile design (Blondet et al., 2006). It is interesting to note that most dwellers of 
adjacent streets to the upgraded house knew about “the house that resisted the earthquake”. 
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 Figure 5.19 Detail of polymer (left) and steel 
(right) nets used for reinforcement of adobe walls 
 
Figure 5.20 Reinforcement of adobe walls with 
nylon net at the laboratory of PUCP 
In the town of Zúñiga a new two-storey house built by the Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) resisted the earthquake with minor damage (Figure 5.21), apart from some cracks that 
developed at the corners of window openings at the second storey quincha walls. The design features 
that contributed to the good performance of the house were: well constructed thick adobe walls, 
machones (thicker portions of the wall) spaced at short intervals and at corners, a rigid wooden roof 
connected to all walls through a wooden ring-beam, a rigid slab foundation at the base, and, although 
not verified in the field, bamboo reinforcing rods running inside the adobe walls. It is worth noting that 
nearby houses of traditional adobe construction did not suffer significant damage, probably because of 
weaker ground motions due to attenuation effects or from better ground conditions, as well as due to 
the lower height of the adobe walls of these constructions. 
 
Figure 5.21 Two-storey adobe (and quincha at 
second storey) built by JICA in Zúñiga for 
earthquake resistance 
 
Figure 5.22 Adobe house in Huangáscar built by 
JICA and designed for earthquake resistance 
Other adobe houses designed with earthquake resistant features were found in the village of 
Huangáscar: a first group of two storey houses similar to that visited in Zúñiga was found at the 
entrance of the village, whereas a second house, at the centre of the village, was constructed with 
closely spaced machones providing lateral support to the walls (Figure 5.22). While these houses were 
built by JICA and performed satisfactorily during the earthquake, other nearby houses of adobe 
traditional construction in Huangáscar were severely damaged (Figure 5.9). 
5.2.2 Reinforced concrete confined masonry 
Most of the engineered houses found in the affected area were of reinforced concrete confined brick 
masonry. This type of construction consists in constructing first the clay brick walls while leaving an 
empty space for placing the reinforcement; concrete is then poured with wooden formwork nailed to 
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the exterior and interior surfaces, thus obtaining a solid joint between the RC frame and the clay bricks. 
In this way the wall structure provided by the clay bricks, which is stiffer than the frame structure of 
the RC elements, shares most of the lateral load of the structure. The construction procedure of this 
type of structures is show in Figure 5.23. 
 
 
Figure 5.23 Construction procedure of confinement elements (AIS, 2001) 
RC confined masonry structures performed very well during the earthquake, with minor or no damage, 
as shown in Figure 5.24, where a two storey building standing next to a collapsed adobe house shows 
no signs of damage in its tile covered façade. 
 
Figure 5.24 Undamaged two storey RC confined 
masonry building next to a collapsed adobe house 
in Ica 
 
Figure 5.25 Six-storey RC confined masonry 
building in Ica, showing no signs of damage 
The good performance of RC confined brick masonry houses, which may reach a height of up to six 
storeys (Figure 5.25), may be explained by the inherent large capacity of the structure to resist lateral 
loads. However, these structures, when reaching their ultimate capacity after failure of the clay brick 
masonry walls, may form soft storey mechanisms if not properly detailed and designed. It is possible 
that this type of failure may have developed in many buildings had the ground motions been higher in 
the affected areas, especially for structures with low construction quality. Therefore, it is recommended 
that the complete load displacement path of these structures up to failure is carefully examined, 
assessing the level of energy dissipation that they can provide and the associated type of failure 
mechanism. 
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5.2.3 Reinforced concrete infilled frames 
Reinforced concrete infilled frames are most commonly found in the largest city centres of Pisco and 
Ica, as multi-storey residential, commercial or office buildings. Only a small number of these structures 
were observed in the visited areas, and many were under construction. In RC infilled frames, infill 
panels are placed in the structure after casting the RC frame elements, thus differing from RC confined 
masonry structures in that the contribution of the infill panels to lateral resistance is limited, conferring 
only to the RC frame elements the main role of resisting earthquake loads. In general, RC infilled 
frames performed satisfactorily, apart from a few cases listed in the following paragraphs. Hospital and 
schools of RC infilled construction are described in Section 10. 
One of the worst collapses associated to RC infilled frames was that of the Embassy Hotel, located in 
Pisco, following the formation of a soft storey mechanism (Figure 5.26); prior to the earthquake, the 
structure had been expanded with additional floors. The collapse was responsible for several casualties 
and at the time of the survey the structure had been demolished and removed (Figure 5.27). A building 
adjacent to the hotel was severely damaged, as reflected by the failure in shear of several columns at 
the first storey with practically no shear reinforcement (Figure 5.28). 
 
Figure 5.26 Collapsed Embassy Hotel in Pisco (Photo Prof. M. Blondet, PUCP, 
www.eeri.org/lfe/images/peru_coast_photos) 
 
Figure 5.27 Severely damaged RC infilled frame 
next to the collapsed Embassy Hotel 
 
Figure 5.28 Detail of column failure in shear of the 
building structure of Figure 5.27 
In Figure 5.29 a four-storey RC infilled structure that collapsed after developing a soft storey 
mechanism is shown, possibly due to the reduction of flexural capacity in the column from the first to 
the second storey, or to deficient detailing of the beam-column connection as shown in Figure 5.30. 
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 Figure 5.29 Four-storey RC infilled frame in Pisco 
showing soft storey collapse at 2nd floor 
 
Figure 5.30 Detail of column failure from the 
building shown in Figure 5.29 
Examples of buildings under construction are shown in Figure 5.31 and Figure 5.32: the first figure 
shows an irregular vertical geometry arrangement that caused extensive yielding of the column at the 
second, soft storey; whereas the second figure shows a five-storey building with flat-slab beams 
running in the direction parallel to the street and that may had suffered extensive damage if it had not 
been properly detailed. 
 
Figure 5.31 Six-storey RC infilled frame in Pisco 
with vertical irregular geometry showing soft 
storey damage 
 
Figure 5.32 Five-storey RC building frame with 
flat-slabs under construction in Ica 
All the RC infilled frame structures described above (with the exception of the flat slab structure) failed 
for one or more of the reasons listed in Section 5.1.3 (factors that make non-engineered RC infilled 
structures vulnerable to earthquakes). It may also be possible to assert that the deficiencies in 
earthquake resistance were more due to the absence of qualified engineers and appropriate controls 
during construction than to old designs, as demonstrated by the damages sustained by newly 
constructed buildings. 
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Back calculation of spectral accelerations at Pozo Santo 
During the field visit, the EEFIT team found several RC billboard structures inifilled with clay bricks: 
one near the Paracas National Reserve (Figure 5.33), which suffered practically no damage, and one at 
Pozo Santo, approximately 25 km southeast of Pisco, which collapsed (Figure 5.34) and is used in the 
present report to perform back calculations to determine the ground accelerations sustained at the site. 
It is worth mentioning that the adjacent structures located at Pozo Santo suffered heavy damage, 
including a church (Figure 5.40) and several one-storey adobe structures. 
 
Figure 5.33 RC infilled frame billboard near the 
Paracas National Reserve 
 
Figure 5.34 RC infilled frame billboard that 
collapsed at Pozo Santo 
The geometry of the billboard at Pozo Santo was measured on site: a 250 mm thick, 7 m in length and 
4.7 m in height rectangular section of clay bricks bounded by 250 mm deep RC elements along the 
perimeter, supported by four 250x250 mm cross section 1.05 m free standing RC columns (Figure 
5.35); in the longitudinal direction the columns were linked by a stiff 500 mm deep RC beam. 
 
Figure 5.35 Overall view of the collapsed 
billboard at Pozo Santo, showing four 250x250 
mm 1.05 m RC columns 
 
Figure 5.36 Detail of the RC columns of the Pozo 
Santo billboard, showing 12 mm diameter steel 
rebars with practically no confinement 
The collapse mode of the billboard shows that failure took place at the boundary between the top of the 
free standing columns and the longitudinal deep beam, suggesting that the damage of the structure 
started in the longitudinal direction (in-plane) followed by overturning of the structure in the transverse 
direction (out-of-plane)4. From the geometry, materials and collapse mode of the structure, it is 
possible to infer the spectral accelerations that occurred at the site. This is done by computing the base 
                                                          
4 Had the collapse been triggered in the transverse, out-of-plane direction, failure would have occurred at the base of the 
columns, where bending moment is maximum.  
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shear associated to the development of the flexural capacity at the top of columns, assuming that the 
longitudinal beam is infinitely stiff and the inflection point is located at 1/4 of the height of the 
columns with respect to the base, reflecting the condition of a flexible foundation. 
The flexural capacity5 of the column is calculated as 18.7 kN-m, assuming a concrete compressive 
strength  fc of 25 MPa and a steel yield strength  fy of 420 MPa (60 ksi steel), with steel rebars 12 mm 
in diameter located at the four corners of the cross section (see Figure 5.36); the concrete covers vary 
between 40 mm and 20 mm (the larger cover is used in the bending moment calculation). 
By dividing the flexural capacity of one column by 0.75 times its free height (equal to 0.79 m), and by 
multiplying the result by four columns, a base shear of 94.7 kN is obtained for the structure in the in-
plane direction. By dividing the base shear by the total mass of the structure, equal to 16,000 kg 
(calculated assuming a clay brick density of 1,800 kg/m3, a RC density of 2,500 kg/m3, and neglecting 
the mass contribution of the free standing columns), a spectral acceleration of 0.60g is obtained. 
In order to relate the spectral acceleration causing failure in the in-plane direction with the response 
spectrum of the earthquake ground motions at the site, it is necessary to obtain the mode of vibration of 
the structure in the longitudinal direction, which is computed from the stiffness of the structure and the 
mass of the billboard used in the base shear calculation. The stiffness of the structure was calculated 
assuming a Young modulus Ec of 30 GPa and a cracked moment of inertia of the columns equal to half 
their gross moment of inertia, resulting in a stiffness equal to 11,5700 kN/m. Based on these 
assumptions the first mode of vibration in the longitudinal direction is equal to 0.074 s. 
The elastic 5% response spectrum predicted by the Atkinson and Boore (2003)6 equations at Pozo 
Santo for stiff soil conditions shows that the periods for which spectral accelerations can induce failure 
in the in-plane direction are between 0.15 and 0.43 seconds (Figure 5.37), the lowest bound not being 
too dissimilar from the value of 0.074 s obtained from the above calculations. 
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Figure 5.37 Predicted 5% response spectrum at Pozo Santo, using Atkinson & Boore (2003) equations 
with NEHRP class C (stiff soil) site conditions. 
 
                                                          
5 Shear failure was not considered as a possible cause of collapse, as the shear capacity of each column, computed 
according to EC2 with no contribution of shear reinforcement, is equal to 42.5 kN, requiring a shear span of 0.44 m, 
shorter than that considered in the calculations, for shear to command with respect to bending in the failure mechanism. 
6 The Atkinson and Boore (2003) equations predict the response spectrum based on magnitude, epicentral distance and 
soil conditions, and were used following the good results obtained in predicting the response spectrum of the ground 
motions recorder at the ICA2 station (See Figure 1.9). 
 35 
In spite of the longer lever arm (3.83 m, at 2/3 of the total height of the structure) and higher period of 
vibration (on the order of 0.2 s) of the structure in the transverse direction, the fact that failure was not 
triggered in the out-of-plane direction may be explained by an elongation of the period due to rocking 
of the foundation to values above 0.95 s, that together with the associated energy dissipation, may had 
resulted in spectral accelerations below 0.12g7 (Figure 5.37), which is the minimum spectral 
acceleration that would had induced failure at the base of columns in the transverse direction. 
The back analysis shows that the ground motions recorded by the accelerometers located in the affected 
area (i.e., ICA2 station) are compatible with the damage sustained by the billboard, and that in the 
absence of base acceleration recordings, the collapse or failure of simple structures can be used to 
derive an estimate of the ground motions at the site, provided that reliable attenuation functions are 
available at the site. 
5.2.4 Steel 
Not many steel structures were found in the area, the few cases corresponding to warehouses, sheds and 
adjacent installations to industrial plants (see Section 9). 
Since the team did not have access for a close inspection to these structures – located in industrial 
plants – it is not possible to make a conclusive statement whether any structure had suffered from local 
buckling or extensive yielding. The only case where damage was observed was to a truss structure in 
the Port of San Martín, where one member showed overall buckling without compromising the stability 
of the structure. Otherwise, the EEFIT team did not observed any global collapses of steel structures. 
5.2.5 Prefabricated 
As for the steel structures, not many prefabricated structures were found in the area, being the most 
common type those corresponding to industrial warehouses. No particular damage was observed on 
these structures during the field mission. 
5.3 Churches 
 
Figure 5.38 Location of the collapsed church in 
Pisco after demolition and debris removal 
Figure 5.39 Typical collapse of a quincha vaulted 
roof of a church in Zúñiga 
The large majority of churches surveyed during the field mission sustained considerable damage after 
failure of the roof (Figure 5.39 and Figure 5.40), longitudinal walls (Figure 1.1) and tower bells (Figure 
                                                          
7 0.12g is obtained by multiplying 0.6g by the ratio of the lever arms in the longitudinal and transverse directions (0.79 m 
/3.83 m). When working with the 5% damped spectra, this value is increased by a factor of 1/0.55, where 0.55 is the 
maximum reduction of the 5% elastic spectra allowed by EC8 to account for higher levels of damping; the 5% damped 
spectral acceleration thus obtained is equal to 0.22g. 
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5.41), causing not only a large number of casualties, but also an important loss in the cultural heritage 
of the region (see Section 12.3.2). 
The church of San Clement of the Compañía de Jesus, in front of the Plaza de Armas in Pisco, 
collapsed during a mourning service at the time of the earthquake event, causing the single largest 
death toll of any structure during the earthquake (Figure 5.38). 
The deficient performance of these structures calls for an extensive effort of earthquake performance 
assessment and upgrading, where required, of those churches that did not collapse or where only lightly 
damaged during the earthquake event. 
Figure 5.40 Church front remains of a collapsed 
church at Pozo Santo 
Figure 5.41 Tilted bell towers of a church next to 
Plaza de Armas in Ica 
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6 Performance of Bridges 
Written by Emily So, University of Cambridge / Fabio Taucer, Joint Research Centre 
Reviewed by Prof. Robin Spence, University of Cambridge 
The description of the performance of bridges has been divided in the present chapter into road and 
pedestrian bridges. Overall, bridge structures performed quite well during the earthquake, with the 
exception of the Huamaní Bridge in San Clemente, described in Section 6.1.1, and a footbridge bridge 
described in Section 6.2. 
6.1 Road bridges 
Stretches of the Pan-American Highway, Peru's main coastal artery, were interrupted due to landslides 
and ground settlements (see Section 3.2) north of Chincha Alta, and to damages sustained by the San 
Clemente Bridge at the crossing of the Pisco river; journey times from Lima to Pisco were reported to 
have increased from 3 to 8 hours in the aftermath of the disaster. At the time of the EEFIT field visit, 
all landslide and ground settlement related damages had been repaired, while an alternative temporary 
route across the dry bed of the Pisco river had been constructed next to the Huamaní Bridge.  
In spite of the low number of bridge structures present in the visited areas along the coast and in the 
valleys of the Ica region (i.e., the terrain arid and mostly flat, with low hills and sand dunes), the EEFIT 
team observed about 10 road bridges of various sizes, which, with the exception of the Huamaní 
Bridge, performed quite satisfactorily, as shown in Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 by two undamaged 
bridges at two crossings of the Ica river in the city of Ica.  
Figure 6.1 First RC bridge crossing the Ica river 
in the city of Ica 
Figure 6.2 Second RC Bridge crossing the Ica 
river in the city of Ica 
6.1.1 Huamaní Bridge in San Clemente 
The Huamaní Bridge in Clemente Bridge is a five span reinforced concrete motorway bridge located at 
km 228 along the Pan American Highway linking the town of San Clemente to Pisco, with a total 
length of approximately 150 m (Figure 6.4). The two main roadways of the earthquake affected area, 
namely the Pan-American Highway and the Carretera los Libertadores, cross at the town of San 
Clemente (Figure 6.3).  
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The bridge was initially opened with a single lane functioning after the main event, but further cracking 
subsequent to an aftershock resulted in closure of the bridge, leading to the construction of the 
alternative crossing through the dry bed of the river. The Minister of Transportation and 
Communication (MTC) informed on 18 September 2007 that repair of the bridge may have required 45 
days of reconstruction works (OCHA SR18, 2007). 
Figure 6.4 Huamaní Bridge along the Pan-
American Highway 
Figure 6.5 Huamaní Bridge: relative displacement 
between bridge sections at hinge location 
Figure 6.6 Huamaní Bridge: shearing off of the 
west parapet at the south abutment 
Figure 6.7 Huamaní Bridge: large size round 
aggregate used in the concrete of abutments 
Figure 6.8 Huamaní Bridge: damage of parapets 
at the second northernmost pier. 
Figure 6.9 Huamaní Bridge: parapet 
reinforcement detailing at the pier. 
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6.2 Footbridges 
The second bridge that was closed is a pedestrian 80 m long suspension bridge located in the 
mountainous area west of Lunahuaná at the crossing of the river Cañete. The bridge collapsed after 
boulders falling from an adjacent slope that sheared off one of the RC towers. Similar footbridge 
suspension bridges were present in the area and were still in service, in spite of poor detailing of the RC 
elements supporting the cables, as evidenced in the footbridge that collapsed. Many of these columns 
showed very little, if any, shear reinforcement, with excessive concrete covers. 
 
Figure 6.10 Pedestrian bridge crossing the Cañete 
river damaged by rock fall. 
Figure 6.11 Reinforcement detailing of the RC 
tower of the collapsed footbridge. 
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7 Performance of Ports and Harbours 
Written by Fabio Taucer, Joint Research Centre 
Reviewed by Paolo Negro, Joint Research Centre 
The region affected by the disaster is characterised by a long coast facing the Pacific Ocean where two 
among the most important ports of Peru are located: El Callao and Puerto de San Martín. 
The activities of the port of El Callao, serving Lima, were not affected by the earthquake; however, 
damage associated to poor soil conditions was reported in the areas adjacent to the port. 
The port of San Martín is located in Punta Pejerrey in a peninsula a few kilometres south of Paracas, 
next to the National Park of Ballestas (Figure 7.1), constructed over a geological formation of plutonic 
rocks (P-pgr, ‘porfido granítico’) of the Batolito de San Nicolás, as shown by the Geological map of 
the Pisco Department prepared by the ‘Instituto Geológico Minero y Metalúrgico of Peru’ (Figure 7.2; 
Ingemmet, 1979). 
The port of San Martín serves as the main node for exporting fish and agricultural products of the Ica 
region. In the aftermath of the disaster, a Mexican hospital-ship and three warships from the Peruvian 
Army carrying 1,500 tons of medicine, water, and fuel, as well as medical personnel, were sent to the 
port of San Martín (OCHA SR3, 2007), which had been set by the Peruvian Civil Defence as one of the 
two emergency posts (the other being at the Pisco Air Force Base) for receiving and organizing 
assistance (OCHA SR12, 2007). 
 
Figure 7.1 Location of Port of San Martín 
(www.earth.google.com) 
Figure 7.2 Geological map of the Pisco 
Department, Port of San Martin at Punta Pejerrey 
(www.ingemmet.gob.pe) 
The visit to the port of San Martín revealed that the access to the dock structures was severely damaged 
(Figure 7.3), resulting from failure and settlement of the underlying soil, composed of a conglomerate 
of angular stones of up to 150 mm in size, mixed with sand (Figure 7.4). The access area at the south 
end of the port showed extensive cracking (with deep cracks widths up to 50 mm) and settled 
approximately 1.2 m with respect to the dock structure and to an adjacent warehouse, both of which did 
not suffer much damage. Two watch towers (located at each end of the port) toppled due to failure of 
the ground and of the supporting RC column (Figure 7.5); one electric transformer next to the 
warehouse also toppled after failure of its support (Figure 7.6). Punching of the pavement from piles 
supporting the access area on the northern part of the port was also observed (Figure 7.7). It was 
reported by the employees of the port that most of the damage took place after the strongest 
aftershocks, with continuous settlement of the ground taking place during the weeks following the main 
earthquake event. 
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Most of the damage suffered by the port of San Martín was due to the poor characteristics and 
compaction of the material used to fill the access structures to the dock; the fill material may had been 
extracted from the nearby shore, which was present along the beaches surrounding the port.  
The dock structure, an 18 m wide reinforced concrete 0.55 m thick slab supported on 600 mm diameter 
circular steel piles spaced at 4 m (Figure 7.8), did not suffer major damage, however, due to failure of 
the access structures it could not be used immediately after the earthquake. The use of the port as an 
emergency centre for receiving assistance became possible only when a temporary access for trucks 
was constructed by levelling with sand and gravel the settlement that had occurred between the access 
and the dock (Figure 7.9). However, major repairs will be needed to restore full operation of the port. 
The supporting infrastructure adjacent to the port suffered only minor damage, such as minor buckling 
that was observed in a braced steel latticed structure; large steel tanks did not suffer major damage and 
remained operational (Figure 7.10). 
Other minor dock structures were surveyed in the area of Paracas, one at the waterfront which showed 
settlement of the dock (Figure 7.11), and a jetty at a Yacht Club south of Paracas that had sustained 
damage after longitudinal hinging of the steel piles at the connection with the pile cap in the 
longitudinal direction (Figure 7.12). The damage to these structures may compromise the development 
of the tourist activity of the area, as many boats depart from Paracas to visit the nearby National 
Reserve. 
Figure 7.3 Port of San Martín: paved access 1.2 m 
settlement with respect to the dock and warehouse 
Figure 7.4 Port of San Martín: fill material of the 
paved access to the dock structure 
Figure 7.5 Port of San Martín: toppled RC watch 
tower (south end) 
Figure 7.6 Port of San Martín: toppled electric 
transformer 
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Figure 7.7 Port of San Martín: pile caps punching 
through the paved access (looking north) 
Figure 7.8 Port of San Martín: RC dock structure 
showing steel piles 
Figure 7.9 Port of San Martín: temporary access 
to the dock at the north end. 
Figure 7.10 Port of San Martín: adjacent steel 
tanks showing no damage 
Figure 7.11 Dock structure in Paracas Figure 7.12 Jetty structure at Yacht Club in 
Paracas: top hinging of steel piles 
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8 Performance of Utility Systems 
Written by Emily So, University of Cambridge / Fabio Taucer, Joint Research Centre 
Reviewed by Prof. Robin Spence, University of Cambridge 
The description of the performance of utility systems is divided into water distribution and wastewater, 
electric distribution, gas/liquid fuels and telecommunications. 
8.1 Water distribution and wastewater 
According to the National Sanitation Authority (SUNASS), the water supply status six days after the 
earthquake main event was as follows (OCHA SR7, 2007): 
o Cañete: water supply 100% in the towns of San Antonio, Chilca, Cerro Azul, Quilmaza, 
Calando and Lunahuaná; water was supplied through tankers in San Luis (70%) and Imperial 
(80%). 
o Chincha: water supply had been restored 100% in the towns of Pueblo Nuevo, Tambo de 
Mora, Chincha Baja, Alto Larán and partially restored (70%) in Chincha Alta and Grocio 
Prado; water was supplied by tankers in the towns of Sunampe and El Carmen. 
o Pisco: water supply network supplied 5% of population, while 95% of the supply was 
channeled through cistern trucks. 
Twelve days after the earthquake, water service through regular pipeline networks in Ica had been 
totally repaired and working at 100% of its capacity. In Chincha and Cañete, 80 % of the water was 
supplied through the water distribution network, while in Pisco the percentage was at only 15% 
(OCHA SR12, 2007). 
The city of Pisco receives water from a filtration plant located 18 miles away in the east direction; 
pipeline damage along the transmission line into the town reduced the flow from 18,000 litres/minute 
to 10,000 litres/minute following the earthquake. The chlorine disinfection system at the operations 
centre in Pisco was also damaged by the earthquake. Bottled water was shipped in through the Port of 
San Martin immediately after the earthquake. In the city, a robust water tank tower (1200 m3 of water 
reservoir) supported by a RC frame structure (Figure 8.5) was still functional after the earthquake and 
was being used to deliver water by means of truck cisterns to the city. 
The EEFIT team visited several concrete water towers and some were noted as damaged and no longer 
operational; the team did not visit any dams, nor was damage reported in any similar structures in the 
affected region. 
8.1.1 Water towers 
In Guadalupe, the team passed near to a concrete water tower which seemed to have suffered little 
damage, but upon further inspection it revealed systematic cracking. The water tower, built in the 
1980’s, is a 20 m high concrete structure supported by a central hollow cylindrical reinforced concrete 
member (3-4 m diameter) and 6 slender 35x25 cm RC columns on the perimeter (Figure 8.1). Damage 
was observed at the central support: at the base, a crack running all the way around the perimeter 
(possibly coinciding with non-staggered splicing of the reinforcement) (Figure 8.2), while at the top, 
cracking was observed just below the tank structure, probably due to punching or excessive shear. 
Although the slender columns shared only a small portion of the lateral load (most of the seismic lateral 
forces were taken by the stiffer, central cylindrical element), signs of uplifting were observed at their 
base. The tank was reported to be empty at the time of the earthquake and was declared unusable after 
it leaked when filling the tank again.  
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Figure 8.1 Water tank near Guadalupe. Figure 8.2 Flexural crack running around the 
perimeter at the base. 
In San Juan, a small town 10-15 km away from Guadalupe, one out of two water towers close to the 
main square was severely damaged (Figure 8.3). Upon closer inspection it was found that the two tanks 
were built at different periods of time, the undamaged, higher tank being of newer construction. The 
older tank showed cracks at the level of an infill wall built at the base (Figure 8.4) and at the 
connection with the main body of the tank. After closer inspection, it was found that there were no 
stirrups and splicing was made at the joints. The fact that the newer tank did not suffer damage is a 
very good demonstration that good earthquake performance can be achieved by following current 
design standards.  
Figure 8.3 Water towers in San Juan (older tank in 
the background). 
Figure 8.4 Damaged column next to infill wall, 
joint showing insufficient reinforcement. 
During the field visit, many other tanks, as the one shown Figure 8.6 were still functional with no 
visible damage. 
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Figure 8.5 Water tower in Pisco. Figure 8.6 Water tower near Guadalupe. 
An interview that the EEFIT team held at the Universidad Pontificia Católica del Perú in Lima with 
Prof. Daniel Quiun Wong revealed that upgrading of some civil infrastructures had been undertaken 
prior to the earthquake, as exemplified by a project were Prof. Quiun had been involved for the retrofit, 
after the earthquake of 1996, of a water tower in Pisco built in the ’60s; the retrofit consisted mainly in 
jacketing the RC columns. 
8.1.2 Wastewater 
On 6 September (22 days after the earthquake), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Pan 
American Health Organization (PAHO) reported that the sanitation system of Pisco had vastly 
collapsed, especially in the main water collection tracts, and that an estimation of the status of the water 
pipelines would had been only possible in the following two weeks (OCHA SR14, 2007).  
Although the wastewater treatment plant of Pisco was not damaged, it was not operational, due to lack 
of power after failure in the electricity transmission lines. Local NGOs provided latrines in and around 
the main squares of Pisco, however these were already overfilling and proving hazardous. Scarce 
information was available on the availability of sanitation facilities in smaller towns and rural areas. 
8.2 Electricity distribution 
Most of the electricity produced in the area affected by the earthquake is produced from hydro power, 
which is transmitted through high voltage lines from the Andes to a substation in Independencia 
District, about 12 miles inland from the Pacific coast; no apparent damage to this substation was 
observed. Electric power from the Independencia substation is distributed through lower voltage lines 
to Pisco, Ica, and Paracas; three line supports failed in the line serving Paracas/San Andrés. 
The buildings housing the electrical substations in Pisco were unaffected and undamaged and 90% of 
the town’s electrical service was restored at the time of the team’s survey. Power company personnel 
indicated that substations were operational within a few days. Some problems were reported in Cañetes 
and Tambo de Mora, as electrical pylons and telecommunication towers had toppled due to liquefaction 
and foundation failure, yet to be repaired five weeks following the main earthquake event. Although 
most of the electricity service had been restored at the time of the field visit, OCHA had reported 
disruptions in both electricity and communications in the first weeks following the earthquake1.  
                                                          
1 (OCHA SR8, 2007): “…The Minister of Energy and Mining reported that in Chincha 60% of street lights and 40% of 
domestic supply are working normally. In Ica, 95% of street lighting and 50% of domestic power supply are working, 
while water supply is totally restored. In Pisco, electric power is currently reaching 30% of street lighting and 15% of 
homes. Power service is improving by the day and it is expected to be totally operational in 10 to 15 days, except in Pisco 
where it could take a little longer (20 days)…” 
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8.3 Gas/Liquid fuels 
There is no gas distribution system in the affected area, as gas is distributed in bottles. A gas duct runs 
from the Andes to the Ica region, the gas being liquefied at a facility in Pisco and then loaded onto 
ships at an offshore facility. No damage was reported at any of these facilities (See Section 9). 
8.4 Telecommunications 
According to the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute report (EERI, 2007), the 
telecommunications hardwired system failed during the earthquake. Cell phone systems were 
functional by 21 August 2007; additional portable call centres were set up at the main square in Pisco. 
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9 Performance of Industrial Buildings 
Written by Emily So, University of Cambridge 
Reviewed by Prof. Robin Spence, University of Cambridge 
An important number of industrial facilities are located along the coast from Lima to Paracas, taking 
advantage of the proximity to the Pan-American Highway and of the main ports near Lima and Pisco 
(Figure 9.1). During the survey the team observed a handful of offshore platforms for processing and 
distributing natural gas and its condensates from the Camisea Natural Gas Project; no damage was 
reported or observed in these installations. 
Figure 9.1 Industrial facilities along the coast near 
Pisco 
Figure 9.2 Toppled RC prefabricated perimeter 
walls and undamaged steel tanks along the coast 
near Pisco 
The EEFIT team also passed nearby the main steel production plant of the Corporación Aceros 
Arequipa S.A., in the vicinity of Pisco. According to the New Zealand Society of Earthquake Engineers 
reconnaissance team (NZSEE, 2007), the plant normally runs three shifts totalling 1200 staff, mostly 
from Pisco. The plant was affected for 4 days following the earthquake, due to disruption to electrical 
power and staff shortages during the first days; there were no associated injuries. By the fourth day 
production was back to 50% and by the sixth day to 100%. The NZSEE team reported very little 
damage to the buildings and the plant.  
Along the coastal routes there were also numerous plants, including steel plants, fertilizer/fish 
processing plants, an air separation plant, oil storage and refining facilities, and units processing fish 
flour and fish oil. The EEFIT team did not visit these facilities but had been told by locals that no 
damage had been reported, even though work had been suspended due to a break in the fishing season 
(damage to the fishing industry related to the Tsunami affected 17,000 families, see Section 4). Most of 
the damage to infrastructure observed by the team on the coastal region was to boundary walls and to a 
few steel trussed structures (Figure 9.2); no damage was observed on the steel tanks. There was also no 
reported damage to the irrigation canals for agriculture. 
In general, the industrial activity suffered more from the shortage of personnel that had to cope with the 
disaster than from the actual damage of the infrastructure. 
9.1 References 
NZSEE (2007) “Observation Diary - Peru Earthquake of 15 August 2007”, New Zealand Society for 
Earthquake Engineering Inc, www.nzsee.org.nz. 
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10 Performance of Hospitals and Schools 
Written by Fabio Taucer, Joint Research Centre 
Reviewed by Paolo Negro, Joint Research Centre 
During the field visit, the EEFIT team put particular importance on the survey of damaged schools and 
hospitals, as their serviceability in the aftermath of an earthquake is crucial for adequate emergency 
operations and post-earthquake recovery. 
A feature that was common to both hospitals and schools in the visited areas is that most of the 
structures that were damaged were either of masonry construction in combination with some type of 
reinforced concrete structure, or as in the majority of cases, corresponded to RC infilled frames built 
between the 1960’s and up to the 1980’s, prior to modern earthquake resistant construction norms. 
According to preliminary assessments of the Peruvian Government (6 September 2007), 14 hospitals 
were destroyed, and 103 were affected in the area (OCHA SR14, 2007). Figure 10.1 shows a public 
structure for the supply of health related services that suffered severe damage; the structure was of RC 
construction in combination with brick masonry. The large damage sustained may hade been caused by 
an irregular geometry in plan and to the presence of large window openings at the second storey; the 
building was being evacuated at the time of the survey; however, it was not clear whether the structure 
would had been demolished or repaired. 
Figure 10.2 shows a new hospital built prior to the earthquake that exhibited adequate performance, 
next to the remains of an older part of the hospital which was severely damaged and demolished after 
the earthquake. 
Figure 10.1 Public health structure being 
evacuated in Pisco 
Figure 10.2 New hospital, built prior to the 
earthquake, next to a previously existing one that 
was severely damaged and demolished in Pisco 
The school infrastructure was severely affected in the region: in Ica 80 schools were reportedly 
damaged with more than 154 temporary prefabricated classrooms needed after the disaster, while in 
Chincha 36 education centres with 324 classrooms were required to restore school activities (OCHA 
SR8, 2007). 
The EEFIT team visited several schools that suffered damage in Ica and Pisco, most of which were 
closed due to extensive damage; no associated casualties or injuries were reported. 
Among the many schools visited, the school of the Gran Unidad Escolar San Luís Gonzaga in Ica is 
emblematic, as it showed most of the damage typologies observed throughout the field visit. According 
to the staff guarding the school premises, the main structure was built in the late 50’s, following the 
construction standards and quality of materials of the time; the date of construction could not be 
verified against official documents. Many elements were constructed with steel deformed bars, which 
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were commonly used only decades later, suggesting that the complex may be the result of several 
additions of building units during time. 
In general, the structure of the schools visited sustained large levels of damage corresponding either to 
designs executed before modern standards of earthquake resistant design or to new designs non-
conforming to current standards (i.e., low quality of materials and poor inspection), characterised by: 
o Large openings at the first storey, with slender, tall columns and rigid roofs/slabs and/or 
beams, resulting in soft-storey mechanisms with failure at the top of columns (Figure 10.3 and 
Figure 10.4) 
o No compliance with capacity design principles that guarantee that plastic hinges are developed 
at beam ends, whereas columns remain elastic or near yielding, thus dissipating energy while 
maintaining structural stability; in fact, in none of the schools visited, cases where beams had 
developed plastic hinges were observed (Figure 10.3, Figure 10.4 and Figure 10.7). 
o Shear failure of columns due to insufficient shear reinforcement (Figure 10.5, Figure 10.6 and 
Figure 10.8) with respect to flexural capacity. 
o Short column shear failure, due to the presence of openings at 3/4 interstorey height for light 
and air circulation (Figure 10.6). 
o Low quality of materials, low strength of concrete and use of poor-quality, large sized stones 
from river beds as aggregate (abundant all through the coast of Peru) (Figure 10.8 and Figure 
10.9). 
o Insufficient detailing of reinforcement (Figure 10.8) concerning: lengths and staggering of 
splicing, development lengths, transverse reinforcement for shear strength and confinement at 
element ends, small diameter of shear links and stirrups with respect to longitudinal 
reinforcement, small diameters of longitudinal reinforcement, excessive or insufficient cover 
of longitudinal reinforcement (Figure 10.9). 
o Inappropriate design of expansion joints, leading to damage after pounding at the roof level 
between independent units (Figure 10.10). 
Even though there were no casualties associated to the schools or hospitals that were damaged, had the 
ground shaking been stronger (i.e., a closer epicentral distance to the affected area) these schools would 
have certainly collapsed, increasing dramatically the death toll, especially among children. 
 
Figure 10.3 Gran Unidad Escolar San Luís 
Gonzaga: column failure at top end  
Figure 10.4 Gran Unidad Escolar San Luís 
Gonzaga: column failure at top end; roof parapet 
activated a strong-beam-weak-column mechanism 
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Figure 10.5 Shear failure at the base of a column 
in a school in Ica 
Figure 10.6 Gran Unidad Escolar San Luís 
Gonzaga: short column shear failure 
  
Figure 10.7 Pisco: School building showing 
failure of column at top end at the second storey, 
due to insufficient shear reinforcement and 
activation of a strong-beam-weak-column 
mechanism 
Figure 10.8 Gran Unidad Escolar San Luis 
Gonzaga: column failure in shear due to 
insufficient shear reinforcement and low quality 
of concrete 
In spite of the fact that most schools were of reinforced concrete construction, in the rural mountain 
areas many schools were of adobe construction. In the town of San Jerónimo (point No. 2, Figure 3.7) 
up the valley of river Cañete, the team visited a school constructed out of adobe (Figure 10.11 and 
Figure 10.12), showing only minor damage, possibly due to attenuation of the ground shaking from the 
larger epicentral distance and to the better quality of the underlying soil (i.e., rock). Had the ground 
shaking been larger, this school would have probably suffered extensive damage. 
The damage caused by the disaster on the school infrastructure calls for an immediate and urgent need 
to assess the earthquake performance and associated risk of collapse of all those schools built prior to 
the enforcement of modern standards of earthquake design and of good construction practice, 
especially of those schools that were not damaged during the present disaster, and upgrading those 
showing poor performance and unacceptable risk of collapse.  
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Figure 10.9 Gran Unidad Escolar San Luis 
Gonzaga: excessive concrete cover, lowering 
design flexural capacity, and poor concrete 
quality 
Figure 10.10 Gran Unidad Escolar San Luis 
Gonzaga: damage due to pounding at ceiling level 
 
Figure 10.11 San Jerónimo (Cañete river valley): 
adobe school showing limited damage 
Figure 10.12 San Jerónimo (Cañete river valley): 
Students inside classrooms 
10.1 References 
OCHA Situation Report 8 (2007) “Peru Earthquake Report No. 8”, United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 22 August. 
OCHA Situation Report 14 (2007) “Peru Earthquake Report No. 14”, United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 6 September. 
11 Management of the Disaster 
Written by Emily So, University of Cambridge / Fabio Taucer, Joint Research Centre 
Reviewed by Prof. Robin Spence, University of Cambridge 
The relief effort was centrally managed by INDECI (Peruvian Civil Defence System - Instituto 
Nacional de Defensa Civil) and was based at the Area 51 Air Base just south of the town of Pisco near 
the coast. The air strip did not suffer major damage from the earthquake, with only a few superficial 
cracks evident in the hangar buildings and in the one-storey reinforced concrete building housing the 
INDECI office. The airstrip was being used for landing supplies from relief organisations. 
Organisations represented at the base include INDECI, Red Cross, UNDP and UNDAC.  
The operations were organised into the following categories:  
o Health and mental health  
o Logistics  
o Coordination  
o Agriculture  
o Education and security 
o Infrastructure  
At the air base, the team met with Carlos Valareso, Raul Lareinz, Agustín Basouri and Percy Alvarado, 
Head of the Coordinating Committee. 
At the time of the visit, INDECI was in the process of carrying out damage evaluation, by comparing 
preliminary damage with actual damage. Out of the 7,000 houses in Pisco, INDECI estimated that 80% 
had been damaged, with 80-90% being of adobe construction. Mr. Lareinz mentioned that INDECI was 
in the process of asking people to move back from the shelter camps to their properties where the 
debris from the collapsed homes had been removed, so that they could establish temporary housing 
before starting reconstruction. 
Figure 11.1 Relief camp in the Viejo Club Atlético 
grounds in Pisco 
Figure 11.2 Relief camp at a park in Pisco 
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INDECI estimated that the city of Pisco would be completely cleared in two and a half months 
following the earthquake event, costing up to US$7 million, not including demolition costs1. The locals 
were being asked to help and were being paid at a rate US$5 for an eight hour day-shift. The public 
ministry, in charge of issuing death certificates to those killed in the earthquake, was compensating 
relatives of the dead with 800 nuevos soles (US$253) for each person killed (see Section 12.2). 
In Pisco, the team visited two temporary relief camps based at the sites of the Viejo Club Atlético 
(Figure 11.1) and at a local park (Figure 11.2). The tents were supplied by INDECI and each of these 
facilities housed nearly 50 families. The shelter camps were working at overcapacity, while the 
adjacent building structures were unusable and hazardous, as these were severely damaged by the 
earthquake. In addition, many of the relief camps visited by the team were set up next to the premises 
of public institutions, such as hospitals, schools, sport facilities, impairing their use and resumption of 
activities (Figure 11.3).2
The EEFIT team also noted that there were groups of tents being erected adjacent to a busy road 
(Figure 11.4) with no proper coordination, amenities or protection, showing that there were no common 
standards or panning in setting up relief camps. The location of these camps next to important roads or 
to areas of demolition, with large quantities of dust particles, could cause respiratory diseases in the 
affected population.  
 
Figure 11.3 Relief camp in premises adjacent to a 
school 
Figure 11.4 Relief camp by the side of the Pan-
American Highway in Chincha. 
The EEFIT team, during the survey of the installations of the Port of San Martín, visited a large 
warehouse used by INDECI to store part of the relief material arriving from other areas in Peru and 
from donor countries and International Organisations3. Outside and inside the warehouse (Figure 11.5 
and Figure 11.6), large quantities of material were stocked and piled up, waiting for distribution one 
month after the disaster, such as tents, mattresses, cooking stoves, water and clothes. 
In fact, during the visit of the EEFIT team to the region of Castrovirreyna and to the towns and villages 
near Guadalupe and El Carmen, as well as in rural areas near the town centres of Ica, Chincha and 
Pisco, it was found that despite some villages being within 20 km of the centre of these cities, not much 
                                                          
1 The cleaning and debris removal in the areas struck by the earthquake was carried out by the “Cash-for-work program” 
(Construyendo Perú), with the participation of 8,000 people and a total investment close to US$3.2 million (OCHA SR7, 
2007). The Ministry of Labor announced in 21 August 2007 that it would assess a budget increase of the programme to 
create 2,000 new temporary jobs in Pisco and another 2,000 in Chincha and Ica (OCHA SR11, 2007). INDECI informed 
that 210,000 m3 of debris have been removed as of September 15th (OCHA SR18, 2007) 
2 INDECI reported a total of 12,000 distributed tents. The 24 camps located in Pisco were supported with food and other 
types of humanitarian aid, from which 4,255 families (21,275 persons) benefited (OCHA SR18, 2007). 
3 INDECI received 12,000 tons of humanitarian aid coming from international and national sources (OCHA SR9, 2007). 
On September 18th, 245 Tons of humanitarian aid and 120 Tons of recycled clothes were stored at the Puerto de San 
Martín (OCHA SR18, 2007). 
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aid had reached the local population, which was relying on local resources to set up temporary shelters 
(Figure 11.7 and Figure 11.8). OXFAM cited the same problems in their assessment reports, saying 
that many villages away from the main roads had been left unaided; serious security problems were 
also recorded, with reports of looting and robberies in towns and villages, as well as along some roads 
immediately after the disaster. 
Figure 11.5 Relief stock of water piled up outside 
the warehouse at the Port of San Martín 
Figure 11.6 Tents being stocked inside the 
warehouse at the Port of San Martín 
  
Figure 11.7 Informal relief camp in rural area near 
Guadalupe 
Figure 11.8 “We need help” sign in rural area near 
Guadalupe. 
Concerning International response, on 28 August, the United Nations and its humanitarian partners 
launched through UNOCHA a Flash Appeal close to US$37 million, in order to assist more than 
200,000 people affected during the six months following the disaster (OCHA SR12, 2007). On 11 
January 2008, Relief Web confirmed that US$20 million of international aid had been financed through 
the United Nations System (ReliefWeb, 2008). 
11.1 References 
OCHA Situation Report 7 (2007) “Peru Earthquake Report No. 7”, United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 21 August. 
OCHA Situation Report 9 (2007) “Peru Earthquake Report No. 9”, United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 24 August. 
OCHA Situation Report 11 (2007) “Peru Earthquake Report No. 11”, United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 27 August. 
 59 
OCHA Situation Report 12 (2007) “Peru Earthquake Report No. 12”, United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 29 August. 
OCHA Situation Report 18 (2007) “Peru Earthquake Report No. 18”, United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 18 September. 
ReliefWeb (2008) “Latest Updates”, United Nations Development Program, 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/LRON-7AYD3M?OpenDocument. 
 60 
12 Socio-Economical Aspects 
Written by Emily So, University of Cambridge / Fabio Taucer, Joint Research Centre 
Reviewed by Prof. Robin Spence, University of Cambridge 
The review of the data gathered during and after the field mission concerning socio-economic aspects 
is presented in the following, addressing issues related to the causalities of the earthquake, social 
welfare, and economic aspects related to industry and tourism. 
12.1 Casualties from the earthquake 
As reported in Section 1, the official death toll at the time of preparing this report stands at 519, with 
1,366 injured (OCHA SR21, 2007), with more than 150 people killed from the collapse of the roof of 
the San Clemente church of the Compañía de Jesús in Pisco during a funeral service. Considering the 
magnitude of the event and the high vulnerability of the building stock, the number of casualties, 
excluding those associated to the collapse of the church, can be considered to have been relatively low. 
One of the possible reasons cited for this is the fact that the ground motion was characterised by two 
portions of strong shaking separated by a relatively calm portion lasting 30-40 seconds, allowing 
people to escape their homes, mostly one-storey high, before collapsing. Another reason is the time of 
day when the earthquake occurred, when most people are awake (for those living in adobe houses who 
had time to escape) and/or outside their homes, either on transit or working in safer engineered building 
structures, such as banks, commercial areas and industrial plants. 
Another reason that may explain the low number of casualties, in spite of the mass devastation such as 
that suffered by the city of Pisco, with 11,017 collapsed houses (OCHA SR18, 2007), is that most 
houses were one-storey high, with light roofs mostly made of quincha (see Section 5.1.1) typical of the 
desert climate of the region, which at the time of collapse may had inflicted minor threats to the life of 
occupants with respect to heavier roofs of houses located in more adverse (rain, cold weather) climates. 
In order to explore these hypotheses and further investigate the causes of injuries, the team enlisted 
Astrid Tolmos (Univ. of Ica) to carry out a questionnaire survey of survivors of the earthquake. This is 
an area in which one of the team members, Emily So, has concentrated much of her current research. 
12.1.1 Casualty Survey 
In all, 115 questionnaires were carried out in the area of Chincha Alta and Pisco and the surrounding 
towns and villages. The thinking behind the design of the questionnaire was simple: it needed to record 
what happens to a survivor of an earthquake from the moment the earthquake happens to the time of 
the interview, and the factors contributing to survival. The key relationship explored is the causal 
pathways of injuries, seeking out links between types and severity of injuries and their causes. It was 
anticipated that survivors would provide data on the following: 
a. The physical location of the survivor (whether inside or outside of a building) 
b. Aspects of human behaviour in response to the earthquake 
c. Physical damage to structures and likely cause 
d. Causes of death and nature and extent of injury to survivors (themselves and others with them) 
e. Search and rescue efforts 
f. Treatment of injuries 
g. Infrastructure and communication disruption 
h. Condition of the survivor, and hopes and concerns for the future 
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 Figure 12.1 A survivor at Chincha Alta being 
interviewed at her shop 
Figure 12.2 Participants of the survey sitting 
outside their temporary housing in the village of 
Grocio Prado 
The survey questionnaire introduced the research aims and sought informed consent, all in the local 
language. The lead questions were open-ended and carefully ordered to give survivors the opportunity 
to tell their stories to an empathetic and active listener, and these were recorded in field notes. This 
meant preparing the interviewer to focus on the humane side of the story, before asking detailed 
questions about the buildings, their injuries and the aftermath of the disaster. From here the interview 
sought factual responses to more specific questions. All interviews were carried out in person and 
interviewers were visiting homes and temporary housing of survivors. 
There are some obvious limitations to the dataset produced from the questionnaires as a representative 
sample of those affected, as the number of people interviewed corresponds to a small sample compared 
to the number of people affected by the earthquake. However, some key findings from this event can be 
drawn from the survey and are presented in the subsequent paragraphs (see Table 12.1). 
Table 12.1 Main characteristics of the earthquake and survey conclusions 
Survey conclusions 
Mag Time Casualties General Terrain Main type of 
building stock 
Main type of 
injuries 
Contribution 
to survival 
Wait  
before help 
arrived 
7.9 18:40 519 Flat, desert Adobe 
Minor cuts 
and bruises, 
fractures 
“Help of 
God”, ability 
to move (2-
phase motion) 
Average 
wait was 1 
day. 
 
The results from the survey show that for people inside buildings at the time of the earthquake, nearly 
all deaths and injuries were directly caused by building collapse as assumed by models such as HAZUS 
(FEMA, 1999) and the Cambridge Casualty Model (Coburn and Spence, 2002). In this earthquake, the 
survey showed that a significant number of people survived in completely collapsed buildings: of those 
in collapsed dwellings (43% of the buildings surveyed), none of the inhabitants were reported to be 
killed and this supports the observation in the field that people were able to get out before their 
dwellings collapsed. What the surveys have highlighted in terms of evasive action is that people who 
were able to get out of their dwellings during the earthquake also knew what earthquakes were (>80% 
of respondents that got out from their dwellings had knowledge of earthquakes). This is an area still 
under assessment at the moment, but brings about interesting questions of climate, culture and 
knowledge as contributors to the proportion of occupant entrapment in collapsed buildings. 
In examining respondents with injuries, for those in buildings, it was conclusive that most of the more 
severe injuries were caused by structural collapses and less severe injuries were caused by failure of 
non-structural elements or by falling of contents. However, the questionnaires also show that serious 
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injuries can be caused by non-structural elements as well, which may occur in collapsed or non-
collapsed buildings. There were a much higher percentage of respondents with lower and upper 
extremity fractures than what shown by the overall statistics posted by INDECI (22% of reported 
injuries).  
Immediately after the earthquake, INDECI posted on their website a list of 1,284 hospitalised injuries 
from the earthquake. These ranged from cuts and bruises to fractures, and also included pneumonia and 
post disaster trauma. The injuries were neither gender specific nor were there an apparent vulnerable 
age group affected. Over half of the hospitalised victims were from Pisco and approximately 20% from 
the Chincha Province. The EEFIT team was told during the visit that many injuries from the more 
remote villages were not treated in hospitals but in medical tents in temporary camps and therefore not 
included in these official figures. 
12.2 Social welfare 
Even though the death toll was almost two orders of magnitude lower than that caused by the 31 May 
1970 7.9 magnitude Chimbote earthquake in Northern Peru, which killed over 70,000 people1, the 15 
August 2007 earthquake affected over 200,000 people2 in one of the country's most economically 
prosperous areas.  
In the immediate days following the earthquake, the lack of water and proper sanitation systems, lack 
of shelter and the presence of dust in the air from debris of the collapsed houses raised the risk of 
respiratory infections and other health problems. Damage to sewage lines and latrines left thousands of 
people without proper sanitation, increasing the risk of gastro-intestinal diseases. 
Figure 12.3 Affected dwellers piling their 
belongings outside their collapsed houses in 
Guadalupe 
Figure 12.4 Temporary accommodations in Pisco 
(made of steel/ aluminium sheets) 
The EEFIT team observed that in the visited area, especially in the main cities, many people were 
walking around aimlessly, in many cases guarding the few belongings and possessions they were able 
to save from the wreckage of their homes, setting up temporary shelters in front of what had been their 
                                                          
1 “Although the earthquake itself caused much death and damage, severe losses were also caused by a huayco (an Inca 
word for avalanche) which swept down the steep slopes of the Cordillera Blanca from the Nevados Huascarán into the 
Callejón del Huaylas, a steep valley paralleling the coast. Yungay and thousands of its residents were buried under tens of 
feet of mud, earth, water, boulders, and debris”. “On May 31, the earthquake and its side-effects damaged more than 70 
percent of the buildings in the valley city, and took an estimated 20,000 lives” (USGS, www.earthquake.usgs.gov)    
2 “…40,035 families [were] rendered homeless and a further 30,542 families have been affected…200,000 people who 
have been directly affected by the earthquake” (Peru Earthquake Flash Appeal, 24 August 2007, United Nations 
Humanitarian Consolidated Appeal Process, www.ochaonline.un.org) 
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homes (Figure 12.3). As a result, the active population, especially single mothers, was not able to carry 
out their daily activities and jobs to economically support their families. 
In response to the strains caused by the disaster on the population, the Peruvian Government announced 
grants to each family whose home was destroyed, as well as money for funeral expenses and the 
injured3, allocating US$82.3 million for the reconstruction of the affected areas (see Section 13). 
However, the large scale of the destruction suggests that rebuilding Pisco and Chincha may cost much 
more, let alone the surrounding villages which at the time of the survey had seen very little of relief and 
aid. The shortage and deficiencies of aid distribution had caused discomfort and anxiety to the 
population, which gathered in the main squares of towns and villages to request aid to the Government 
(Figure 12.5 and Figure 12.6). 
 
Figure 12.5 People gathering at the Plaza de 
Armas in Pisco 
Figure 12.6 Riot police on standby by the main 
square of Pisco during a demonstration 
In addition, there were problems of schooling, hospital care and security. During informal interviews of 
the EEFIT team with the local population, it was common to hear that people had lost their homes and 
that all they had were insecure tents or temporary make-shift shelters (Figure 12.4). Most children were 
at home or at relief camps, as most schools were not functioning and parents had to look after them. In 
most of the towns the team reported people clearing in appalling dusty conditions, salvaging adobe 
bricks and in some cases starting reconstruction. There is, however, interest within the locals to build 
with earthquake safe houses and many had enquired about seismic resistant adobe housing. 
12.3 Economic 
12.3.1 Agricultural, fishing and industrial activities 
The economic activity was also affected by the earthquake. The region of Ica is one of the most 
important agricultural centres of Peru, producing and exporting asparagus (Figure 12.7) and other crops 
such as fruits and grapes (Figure 12.8) for the production of wine and spirits4. The costal area is also a 
                                                          
3 The Peruvian Government approved on 17 August 2007 a compensation fund providing US$312 per family for each 
dead member and US$1,875 per family to reconstruct destroyed houses (OCHA SR3, 2007); on 21 August 2007 
approximately US$ 190,000 were transferred to INDECI to support the victims’ families burial activities (OCHA SR7, 
2007). On 28 August, the first 800 soles (US$253) checks were disbursed to cover the costs incurred by family members 
accompanying the injured to Lima for medical attention (OCHA SR12, 2007). Approximately, US$7.6 millions were 
transferred to the Ministry of Women and Social Development in order to procure food through the World Food Program 
(OCHA SR6, 2007). 
4 According to the Ministry of Trade and Tourism, on 22 August 2007, agro-exports in the emergency area had recovered 
to 70% of their pre-earthquake capacity. Economic activity in the area was expected to gradually regain full capacity as 
power supply was being restored. In the textile sector, the main companies located in Ica and Chincha had also restarted 
their activity, although not at 100% (OCHA SR8, 2007). 
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very important centre for processing and exporting fish related products5. As described in Section 9, 
most of the agricultural and industrial infrastructure had not been damaged during the earthquake. 
 
Figure 12.7 Asparagus crops in the Ica region Figure 12.8 Grape vineyard near Guadalupe  
During the first week following the earthquake, AIR worldwide (www.air-worldwide.com), a Boston-
based catastrophe modelling firm, estimated that insured losses, hitting mostly the commercial sector, 
would not had been over US$1 billion. This figure may underestimate the actual economic losses 
sustained, as the industrial and agricultural sector had a slow recovery of production to full capacity in 
the weeks following the disaster resulting from shortages of staff that had to cope with the disaster. 
12.3.2 Tourism 
 
Figure 12.9 XVII century chapel in Hacienda San 
José near El Carmen with damaged bell tower. 
Figure 12.10 La Catedrál natural rock formation 
in Paracas National Reserve (from www.tierra-
inca.com)  
Collapsed portion 
In terms of tourism, although not as popular as Machu Picchu or the Nazca Lines (the latter also 
located in the Ica region farther away from the epicentre and not sustaining damage), the Ica region was 
affected by the fact that many of the historic churches had collapsed. According to the National Culture 
Institute, the event badly damaged at least 173 churches, monuments and historic buildings, with about 
one-third completely destroyed. In particular, the 329-year-old colonial Hacienda San José, outside the 
city of Chincha, suffered from partially collapsed walls, but was largely intact (Figure 5.13), saved by 
its wooden roof and the collapsed bell tower of its XVII century chapel (Figure 12.9). The hacienda 
                                                          
5 On 26 August 2007, traditional fishers of Ica received help from the Ministry of Production to resume their activities. 
The Ministry provided nets and other fishing equipment. As a result of the earthquake, docks and other fishing 
infrastructure in San Andrés, Laguna Grande, Lagunillas, Chaco and Tambo de Mora were damaged (OCHA SR11, 
2007). 
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(farmstead) was declared a national monument in the late 1960s and was under renovation to resume as 
a resort hotel serving local tourists. 
A natural rock formation, known as the “Catedral”, a major tourist attraction in Peru located in the 
Paracas National Reserve, had collapsed into the sea during the earthquake (Figure 12.10). 
In Pisco, the five-story Embassy Hotel ‘pancaked’ onto its ground floor (see Section 5.2.3) killing 15, 
while all other hotels in the area had only suffered minor damage, with a few exceptions that had major 
cracking and were closed for repairs during the EEFIT team’s visit. 
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13 Reconstruction Issues 
Written by Emily So, University of Cambridge / Fabio Taucer, Joint Research Centre 
Reviewed by Prof. Robin Spence, University of Cambridge 
As mentioned in Sections 11 and 12, emergency relief had not been very effective in rural areas, 
especially in the mountains, where families that had lost their homes were starting reconstruction using 
adobe bricks (Figure 13.1) from the previous existing houses that collapsed. 
Most of the reconstruction was taking place using either traditional techniques of adobe construction 
(Figure 13.2), in the case of the more poor families, or non-engineered techniques for the construction 
of reinforced concrete confined masonry houses, in the case of families with higher economic means 
(Figure 13.3 and Figure 13.4). 
  
Figure 13.1 Adobe bricks ready for use in 
reconstruction in Chincha Alta 
Figure 13.2 Reconstruction of an adobe wall using 
traditional techniques in El Carmen 
  
Figure 13.3 Reconstruction taking place in 
Chincha Alta 
Figure 13.4 Reconstruction using RC in Chincha 
Alta without adequate technical assistance 
The reconstruction of adobe houses was mostly observed in rural areas, while that of non-engineered 
RC frame and RC confined masonry houses was typically observed in urban centres, resulting in both 
cases in highly vulnerable constructions to earthquake hazard, thus re-establishing the same high risk 
present before the earthquake event. 
‘Self’ reconstruction of non-engineered houses may be seen as a way for the local population to cover 
immediate shelter needs and the deficit resulting from insufficient resources (both in budget and 
timing) of the Government to finance the reconstruction of engineered houses. Therefore, some kind of 
assistance and control aimed at increasing the quality and earthquake resistance of the rebuilding of 
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houses not assisted directly by the Government would be desirable to diminish the risk to future, 
similar earthquake events. This type of objective can only be achieved by implementing a 
comprehensive program that involves the participation of institutional organizations, NGO’s, 
Universities, and most important, the active participation of the local population. 
13.1 National response 
On 28 August 2007, the Peruvian Congress discussed and approved a law to create a special, new 
autonomous Fund for the Reconstruction of the South (FORSUR) in charge of the reconstruction of the 
areas affected by the earthquake (OCHA SR11 and SR12, 2007), building upon the successful 
experience s achieved by the Reconstruction Fund for the Coffee Region (FOREC, Fondo para la 
Reconstrucción del Eje cafetero)1 of the areas damaged in Colombia after the January 1999 earthquake. 
To this end, the Peruvian Government planned on 24 August 2007 to earmark 260 millions of nuevos 
soles (US$82.3 million) to FORSUR by the end of 2007 to lead the reconstruction process in 
coordination with ministers, regional presidents and local authorities (OCHA SR10, 2007). 
A supplementary credit of US$31.6 million was authorized on 29 August by the Peruvian government 
for the reconstruction of public infrastructure (OCHA SR6, 2007). 
On 28 March 2008, FORSUR transferred to the mayor of Chincha the amount of 722,200 nuevos soles 
(US$228,400) for relocating the 440 families that had lost their homes in the district of Tambo de Mora 
in the areas affected by liquefaction; to prevent the construction of new houses, a memorial park for the 
victims of the 15 August earthquake will be built in the affected area (www.peru.com, 28/03/08). 
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1 Rather than using a centrally-directed approach, this program adopted an innovative, decentralized method relying on 
community organizations in the municipalities. For housing reconstruction, FOREC gave subsidies rather than carrying 
out the construction itself. NGOs were contracted to manage the reconstruction effort in 32 zones in coordination with 
municipal and regional governments. These measures were so successful that in 2000 the United Nations awarded 
FOREC the Sasakawa Prize, which honours entities that prevent or lower the risk of natural disasters (World Bank, 
2007). 
 68 
14 Conclusions 
Written by Fabio Taucer, Joint Research Centre / 
Dr John Alarcón, Arup / Emily So, University of Cambridge 
Reviewed by Paolo Negro, Joint Research Centre 
From the findings of the mission, the following set of conclusions may be drawn: 
1. The entity and magnitude of the disaster caused by the earthquake event was the result of a 
combination of several factors: 
o The large magnitude, shallow depth and intermediate1 epicentral distance of the main event to 
the affected area (i.e., Hazard). 
o The high vulnerability of traditional earth constructions (adobe, or a combination with 
quincha, masonry and/or RC) and reinforced concrete (RC) infilled frames non-conforming to 
modern earthquake resistant construction standards (i.e., Vulnerability).  
o The location of building structures and constructions on poor quality soils susceptible to 
liquefaction and to ground failure, as well as in areas exposed to Tsunami. In mountain areas, 
rural houses constructed on or near slopes without proper consideration of the risk associated 
to landslides and/or falling of boulder debris (i.e., Urban Planning). 
o Difficulties in managing the emergency after the disaster2 (i.e., Disaster management). 
2. In spite of the large number of destroyed houses (58,581) and affected population (200,000), the 
number of casualties that resulted from the earthquake disaster was comparatively low (519 deaths), 
due to three main factors: the long duration of the earthquake event with an intermediate portion of 
low level ground motions that allowed dwellers to escape, the fact that most adobe houses were 
single storey with light roofs – typical of arid climates –, and the time of the day (18:40, local time), 
when most people are awake and out of their homes. 
3. Traditional earth structures, in particular those of adobe construction, designed without the 
inclusion of any kind of reinforcement3, and without the consideration of earthquake resistant 
concepts4, are susceptible to collapse in a sudden, brittle manner, causing the deaths/injuries of their 
occupants and the complete loss of the housing structure. 
4. Structures built according to current standards for earthquake resistant design, such as 1 to 6 storey 
RC confined masonry buildings, performed satisfactorily with minimum levels of damage for the 
levels of ground motions induced in the affected areas. 
5. Schools and hospitals built prior to current standards of earthquake resistant design sustained high 
levels of damage, due to insufficient strength, ductility, appropriate detailing and unfavourable 
                                                          
1 The city of Pisco and Chincha Alta were located at 70 and 50 km from the epicentre, respectively; a larger and more 
devastating disaster would have resulted had the epicentre been located at a closer distance to these two cities. 
2 During the visit to the Port of San Martín, large stocks of emergency material (tents, water, furnaces, clothes) where 
stored without being distributed, almost one month after the earthquake event. Many of the emergency camps and shelters 
visited were overcrowded and located at open air premises next to schools and hospitals, some of which had suffered 
severe damage, thus preventing their repair and further re-establishing of activities. 
3 Typical reinforcement consists of bamboo rods running into the walls, or a steel or polyester net plastered and attached 
onto the exterior and interior surfaces. 
4 Earthquake resistant concepts consist of regular geometries, small openings, short unsupported lengths of walls, stocky 
walls and rigid roof/floor diagrams. 
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global geometries (soft storeys, short columns), as well as due to the low quality of construction 
materials.  
6. Earth structures (one storey adobe or combined with quincha at the second storey) designed for 
earthquake resistance and built by the NGO’s and International Agencies present in Peru, with the 
participation of universities and research institutions, prior to the earthquake event, performed 
satisfactorily. 
7. Most of the attention in emergency relief was focused in the largest cities (Ica, Pisco and Chincha 
Alta), while rural, remote areas, especially along the valleys running up the Andes, were facing 
delays in receiving emergency relief. 
8. As the reconstruction process led by governmental institutions had not commenced at the time of 
the field mission, part of the affected population had already started reconstruction, in general 
without qualified assistance. In rural areas with higher levels of poverty, the adobe bricks from the 
fallen houses were being reused for reconstruction following traditional techniques, thus re-
establishing the same level of high risk that existed prior to the earthquake event.  
9. During informal interviews, the affected population showed a high level of receptiveness, 
expressing their concern in reconstructing earthquake safe houses, different from those that 
collapsed, and in adopting and following any guidance that could be given by external sources for 
earthquake safe construction. In particular, it is important to mention the awareness of the 
population resulting from the good performance shown by the earthquake resistant adobe houses 
that were built before the earthquake event (see (6)). 
10. The Peruvian Civil Protection (INDECI), the Delegation of the European Commission in Peru and 
PREDECAM (Apoyo a la Prevención de Desasters de la Comunidad Andina), expressed strong 
interest in the results of the EEFIT field mission, namely conclusions and recommendations, which 
were regarded as valuable in the process of planning and assisting the reconstruction phase. 
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15 Recommendations 
Written by Fabio Taucer, Joint Research Centre / 
Dr John Alarcón, Arup / Emily So, University of Cambridge 
Reviewed by Paolo Negro, Joint Research Centre 
From the list of conclusions given in Section 15, it is possible to draw the following set of 
recommendations, aimed mainly to assist the reconstruction phase with the objective of reducing the 
earthquake risk in the affected area: 
1. Where reconstruction is carried out by adopting current standards of design and modern 
construction technologies (e.g., reinforced concrete (RC) confined brick masonry), attention should 
be placed in guaranteeing a good quality of construction and earthquake resistant designs, by 
ensuring adequate levels of inspection and review of the proposed designs. 
2. All the schools and hospitals in the Province of Ica designed prior to current standards of 
earthquake design, including those that did not sustain considerable levels of damage, should be 
assessed for adequate performance and, if needed, upgraded. 
3. The upgrading of structures, including those that suffered damage during the earthquake event, in 
particular schools and hospitals, should be carried out by qualified engineers, using the support of 
national and international norms (e.g., Eurocode EN 1998-3: Assessment and retrofitting of 
structures). 
4. The successful performance of RC confined brick masonry buildings, which are becoming the main 
typology of ‘modern’ buildings in Peru, should be assessed more in detail, especially with regards 
to the effective levels of ground motions to which they were exposed during the earthquake, 
assessing their performance until collapse and recognising the levels of construction quality present 
in the area. 
5. The successful performance of the upgraded, and of the new earthquake resistant designed adobe 
houses described in Section 5.2.1, suggests that further research should be promoted in order to 
produce consolidated guidelines for the assessment, retrofit and design of adobe structures (see 
(10)). Cost analysis studies should be carried out in order to determine the feasibility of investing in 
upgrading the existing adobe building stock most at risk. 
6. All the reconstruction should take place in land with adequate soil conditions, relocating those 
structures built on soil that suffered from liquefaction effects. If reconstruction takes place in areas 
prone to liquefaction, the underlying soil should be upgraded and stabilised after performing a cost-
benefit analysis with respect to the solution of relocation. This activity requires adequate urban 
planning through the involvement of the Municipalities, using the available data on soil conditions 
and risk maps (including Tsunami) prepared by the Civil Protection and Universities in Peru. 
7. It is very important that timely action is taken in the aftermath of the disaster to assist the 
reconstruction of safe earthquake resistant adobe houses in distant rural areas, where, owing to the 
difficulties of Governmental Institutions in providing support, families start the reconstruction of 
adobe houses following traditional techniques, thus re-establishing the high level of seismic risk 
existing prior to the earthquake event. 
8. It is recommended that the support towards reconstruction in rural, remote areas, as described in 
(6), involves the participation of the affected population, by creating awareness on the basic 
principles of risk mitigation, and by identifying local leaders that can be trained and act as 
conveyors of the principles of earthquake resistant design of adobe houses1. 
                                                          
1 Based on the experience from previous earthquake disasters, effective communication is vital for reconstruction, such as 
setting up small groups for demonstration activities addressing adequate practices for earthquake safe reconstruction 
(using for example, simple leaflets adapted to the local population) and training of local builders. 
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9. The process described in (8) can only be successful by means of an effective collaboration of: 
o NGO’s and International agencies, that have a long experience in the field of reconstruction 
through the development of projects that account for socio-economical aspects and the 
participation of local communities; 
o Universities and research centres, that possess the technical expertise related to the design, 
upgrading and construction of earthquake resistant houses; 
o Official institutions, through the Municipalities, in charge of urban planning for the correct 
location of reconstruction projects, as well as for giving financial and legal support to the 
reconstruction activities; 
o International Institutions, such as the European Commission, PREDECAN (Prevención de 
Desastres en la Comunidad Andina), the World Bank, ISDR, USAID, etc., that can 
effectively contribute with additional funds and that can advice to the Governmental 
Institutions on the management of the reconstruction process. 
International
InstitutionsUniversities
NGO’sGovernmentalInstitutions
Local
Population
 
Figure 15.1 Reconstruction process: Collaboration between local population and external actors 
10. In view of the fact that the building stock in Peru, especially in rural areas and away from large 
urban centres, is mostly composed of adobe houses, it is recommended that the Peruvian 
Construction Standards are updated to reflect the latest techniques for the construction of 
earthquake resistant adobe houses and the upgrading of existing ones. 
 
Figure 15.2 A sustainable reconstruction process should lead to the transition from temporary shelters 
built after the disaster to earthquake resistant designs using local materials and workmanship (Photos 
from Cañete river valley near Huangáscar) 
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